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In this thesis I ask if financialisation – the increasing influence of the financial sector – may 
cause a dual effect of increased economic growth and decrease wage share of total income. I 
operationalise financialisation as financial deregulation and test its effects utilising a nested 
analysis. The results from a regression on OECD-member states from 1991 to 2005 indicate 
that credit controls as a specific category of financial deregulation decreases economic 
growth and that deregulation of banking supervisory agencies increases the wage share of 
total national income. Canada’s Bill C-67 of 1999, deregulating foreign bank entry, is selected 
as the case to be studied in-depth based on the regression results. I then conduct process 
tracing on theorised mechanisms of foreign bank entry in Canada. I find that foreign bank 
entry in Canada brought economic growth through foreign direct investment. I also find that 
the wage share of total national income was reduced from credit-led growth and finance-led 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The last five decades of political and economic development have been characterised by 
financialisation – a process wherein the financial sector becomes ever more influential in the 
economy as a whole (Epstein 2005, 3). The Great Recession of 2008 revealed the devastating 
consequences of that process, shocking scholars, financiers and lay people alike. While 
financialisation has become a far more debated and researched issue the last years, this 
research has predominantly focused on the United States in general and the Great Recession 
in particular. In this thesis, I explore the effects of financialisation on a wider set of countries 
and in a wider timeframe. 
 
The literature on financialisation explores many effects of financialisation, and this provides 
the springboard for my own research. Some of these effects appear to be contradictory in 
nature: While some research finds financialisation to cause economic growth, and thus to 
have a positive effect, others find that workers are worse off as a result of financialisation, and 
thus that it has a negative effect. Rather than viewing these consequences as contradictory, I 
argue in this thesis that what we are witnessing is in fact a dual effect wherein the degree to 
which workers benefit from the total potential rewards generated by economic growth is 
potentially quite different from the growth in the total income. Following this line of thinking, 
my research question thus becomes: 
 
Does financialisation cause a dual effect of increased economic growth alongside a 
decreased share of total income appropriated by labour? 
 
This research question will guide every aspect and decision of this thesis. Using a multi-
method approach, I conduct a regression analysis on OECD-member states utilising various 
categories of financial deregulations, representing one dimension of financialisation. These 
categorises are tested against two dependent variables reflecting the anticipated dual effect: 
economic growth and wage share of total income in the economy. I then proceed to use these 
results for case selection in a more focused analysis in which I separate categories of financial 





the case of Canada and the introduction of Bill C-67 in 1999. This bill removed barriers for 
foreign banks to establish local branches. The contradiction between the quantitative findings 
on bank entry and the qualitative findings examining foreign bank entry is discussed in 
chapter four. By employing the toolset of process tracing, I test six unique mechanisms with 
respect to their explanatory power for understanding potential effects of this concrete case of 
deregulation, a key policy component of financialisation. 
 
My findings show that there does indeed appear to be a dual effect, but in the opposite 
direction of that which is stated research question presented above. The regression results 
indicate that deregulating credit controls decreases economic growth, whereas deregulating 
banking supervisory agencies increases the wage share. Deregulating entry barriers for new 
banks does not show a statistically significant effect upon growth. In the qualitative analysis, I 
find that Canada’s deregulation of foreign bank entry barriers contributed to economic growth 
through the foreign direct investment inflow that increases alongside the establishment of 
local branches by foreign banks establish local offices. When examining wage share, I find 
that it decreased as a result of widespread use of credit to fund general consumption. I also 
find the shift in investment to the financial sector to create economic growth without 
benefitting workers, thus decreasing the wage share. These findings primarily serve as a 
historical explanation of what happened in Canada in the years after 1999. They also give 
indications of where one might find an effect of financialisation in other cases, thus 
contributing to the wider financialisation literature as well as to Canada-specific literature. 
 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two engages in a conceptual discussion. 
Financialisation is a concept of notorious ambiguity and thus requires rigorous clarity in its 
definition as well as in its components. Other key terms of the research question are also 
discussed here. Chapter three presents an overview of the existing literature, a more detailed 
account of financialisation and its origins, a discussion of financial deregulation as a central 
dimension of financialisation, and finally the mechanisms of financial deregulation are 
considered. Chapter four outlines the nested framework guiding this thesis, conducts a 
regression analysis and employs the regression results in case selection. Chapter 5 introduces 
the methodological implications and assumptions of process tracing, and then conducts said 





both the regression and the process tracing against the research question and theoretical 







Chapter 2: Conceptualisation 
 
In this chapter I discuss they key concepts of this thesis. They are introduced, problematised 
and defined in the order in which they will be used henceforth. Conceptualisation is an 
important task that should be conducted by all researchers as it helps the reader understand 
what the central concepts are. Furthermore, it contextualises the research. Some concepts may 
be uniquely fit to a certain place, time or other condition. In the words of Sartori, “We cannot 
measure unless we know first what it is that we are measuring” (Sartori 1970, 1038). The 
seminal work by Sartori on conceptualisation serves as a framework for this chapter. 
 
2.1 The financial sector 
 
The first task is to clarify what the financial sector is. Given that the research question relates 
to the effect of financialisation – interpreted as financial deregulation – on economic growth 
and wage share, the financial sector occupies the space wherein half of this thesis takes place 
– the other half is situated in the political space. The financial sector can in its most basic 
form be defined as those individuals and corporations dealing with value items, or items that 
have no other purpose than to hold value (Krippner 2005, 174; Toporowski 2016, 119; 
“Financial Soundness Indicators: Compilation Guide” 2006). Value items include credit, 
stocks, securities, and currencies, among other things. Some examples of institutions dealing 
with these items are banks (commercial banks, investment banks and others), credit rating 
agencies, stock brokerages, insurance agencies and investment funds. For non-academic 
readers, the financial sector is typically identified by a limited geographical location, such as 
Wall Street, City of London and Kabutochō in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Japan, respectively. 
 
“Financial crisis” is a term used regularly throughout this thesis. It is an umbrella term of 
colloquial origin that covers economic depressions and recessions that originated in the 
financial sector. These two types of events are in turn terms with definitions that border 
between mathematical precision and arbitrary vagueness. Recessions are periods of minimum 
two quarters of a year in which GDP is reduced, whereas repressions are generally referred to 





10% (Mankiw 2018, 702). While both of these definitions can be measured with precision, 
the threshold at which we call them recessions and depressions are arbitrarily set. In the real 
world, there is no categorical difference between a 9% decrease of GDP versus a 10% 
decrease, other than that the latter has somewhat larger consequences. What complicates this 
picture more is the fact that crises, and especially severe ones, are historically limited. 
Conducting quantitative analyses on events at which GDP decreases more than 10% would 
likely be impossible due to lack of observations. For the sake of not being restricted by 
arbitrary thresholds, “financial crises” is employed in discussing macroeconomic events here. 
It is, however, insufficiently precise to be used in either analysis conducted later.  
 
Though “sector” is used when discussing the financial sector, it cannot be equated with other 
economic sectors such as “the agricultural sector” which is defined by its products and 
services, or “the private sector” which is defined by the ownership model of a business. The 
agricultural sector is categorically comparable to “the construction sector”, “the educational 
sector” and others. The private sector is equivalent and opposite to “the public sector”, as well 
as sometimes “the non-profit sector”. The main difference between finance on the one hand 
and the agricultural and private sectors on the other hand is that the colloquial use of “sector” 
implies that they are a part of something larger. In the same sense that urban districts are parts 
of a larger city, economic sectors are parts of a larger economy. This is not the case with the 
financial sector. This difference cannot be overstated and deserves its own discussion. The 
comparable equivalent to the financial sector is the real economy, or the productive sector. 
 
2.2 The real economy/productive sector 
 
What is in most contexts referred to as simply “the economy” is the same as that which is here 
referred to as “the real economy”. The approach employed here to understanding the 
economy is one mainly advanced in heterodox research – a group of research identified by, 
among other things, certain axioms about the economy (Rochon and Rossi 2016, 36). The 
heterodox approach and its challengers are discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
However, this thesis can be characterised as belonging to the heterodox camp, and as such 
this should be clarified as soon as possible so there is no opacity regarding the framework 





transparency of the chosen approach and this approach is being consistently followed one can 
freely disagree with the choice of conducting a heterodox analysis. 
 
The emphasis on real is commonly found in this heterodox literature. The background for this 
distinction between real and finance originates in an understanding of financial products as 
not reflecting productive value (Bortis 2016, 45; Bresser-Pereira 2010, 522; Foster and 
McChesney 2012, 54; Stockhammer 2004, 719). Marx also touched upon this disconnection 
with his “Money → Money’” formula (Marx 1894, 219). This formula describes a closed 
circuit where money was used to create more money without ever touching on consumption 
or production of any type – a moneymaking model he saw as increasingly common.  
 
Consider the price of a share in a company. A share – or a stock, which for all intents and 
purposes is the same as a share – represents a small fraction of ownership in a company and 
will thus reflect a fraction of that business’ value. 1% of Google’s total number of shares 
equals 1% of Google’s value. This is exactly how shares work during an Initial Public 
Offering, when a company decides to sell stocks for the first time. However, as soon as the 
shares are sold for the second time, there is no fundamental process of evaluating them in line 
with the underlying company and so they are valued according to their independent demand. 
At this point they no longer reflect the value of the company’s assets precisely and live a life 
of their own in the stock market, primarily reflecting supply and demand. It should be re-
stated for the sake of clarity that this view of financial value is one advocated primarily by 
Marxist scholars. 
 
This does not mean that the demand and thus also the price of a share is unaffected by the 
company’s value. It is very likely investors will buy shares and drive up the prices when they 
receive news that the company’s value increases, such as if they made an innovative 
breakthrough. However, it is the perception of increased value that increase the value 
(Cassidy 2009, 171). The share price has not increased because of the innovation, but because 
it is thought to increase because of innovation. Any connection between the share price and 
company value is secondary. Describing this process requires extremely fine precision, but it 






There are numerous examples that illustrates this. The most (in)famous of these are the recent 
events surrounding the “GME” stock of GameStop which saw a price increase of 
approximately 7.800% over the span of half a year, and 1.700% in the last month before it 
peaked in January 2021. If this increase was to reflect the real value of GameStop they would 
have to had increase their tangible assets by the same percentage. If we enter the volume of 
shares available for trading into the equation, that would make GameStop worth 261.853.000 
USD in August of 2020 and 22.692.403.000 USD in January 2021. One does not need to 
subscribe to a Marxist world view to understand that GameStop did not acquire that 22 
billions of capital in 5 months. Claims that this wealth was “created” by this event (Frank 
2021) are simultaneously both wrong and correct. They are wrong because nothing tangible 
was created and no materialistic value has been added to the world. Nothing had changed at 
GameStop. Yet, they are correct because GameStop indeed was worth more than 22 billion at 
its peak in January 2021. This contradiction illustrates how absurdly disconnected the 
financial sector is from the real economy. While mainstream (not heterodox) economists did 
take note of this event, it was simply brushed off as an exception without further analysis 
(Bezek 2021; Orland 2021). In reality, there is no fundamental law that connects stock prices 




The single concept which this entire thesis revolves around is financialisation. While 
conceptualisation should be conducted in all research, financialisation is a field where that is 
particularly important. Conceptual clarity is vital to ensuring that one is measuring what one 
intends to measure, and to ensure that conclusions drawn correspond to the conclusions than 
can be drawn based on the conceptualisation (Gerring 2012, 163).  
 
Financialisation is an infamously vague concept with no single meaning that all, or even most, 
of its proponents agree on (Aalbers 2019, 2; Epstein 2016, 321; Sawyer 2014, 6). The most 
fruitful attempt at defining this and the one that is most often referred to is that by Epstein 
where he defines it as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial 
actors and financial institutions in the operations of the domestic and international 





this research field is provided by Krippner: “I define financialization as a pattern of 
accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through 
trade and commodity production” (Krippner 2005, 174). A key similarity between these two 
is that they both see the extension of financialisation as a process, not as historic snapshot nor 
as a goal for the future. Beyond that, they differ somewhat on financialisaton’s intensions, 
where Epstein is more concerned about the financial sector as a whole, and Krippner narrows 
it down to sources of profit. Both serve as useful guidelines for this thesis. Another takeaway 
from both definitions is that they do not set any temporal or spatial criteria to what can be 
considered financialisation. They both consider financialisation as high level category (Sartori 
1970, 1044). This thesis will employ a slightly adjusted definition of financialisation. 
 
I rely on Epstein’s understanding of financialisation as a wide process which allows for 
multiple subdimensions to be identified and studied. Temporal and spatial properties are 
added to this definition by viewing financialisation as financialisation originating in 
stagnation – a process which will be outlined in detail in the next chapter. For now, it suffices 
to know that stagnation started in the 1970s and is a result of highly developed, “mature” 
capitalism (Foster 2007, 2).  
 
Clarifying the scope of stagnation is important to determine the time and place to be studied. 
Highly developed, mature capitalist societies are here interpreted as those with a large 
economy and a correspondingly large financial sector. This is conceptually highly similar to 
the criteria for joining the OECD. The conditions of a large economy and financial sector are 
met by OECD-member states. The coverage of the empirical work in this thesis is thus limited 
to the OECD-member states in the period 1970 until today. This has implications for when-
where financialisation can plausibly be found, what data should be used and the scope of my 
conclusions. By imposing additional elements to the definition of financialisation – in other 
words, by restricting it in time and space – we move down the ladder of abstraction to a 
medium level category (Sartori 1970, 1044). This also has implications for how generalisable 
the results of my empirical investigations are. This definition allows for viewing 
financialisation in terms of five key processes that are widely agreed upon in the literature as 
being manifestations of financialisation. These processes, or dimension, are financial sector 





deregulation of the financial sector. All of these will be further engaged with in the theoretical 
chapter. They are nevertheless introduced and unpacked here to provide a clear picture of 
what financialisation is. 
 
2.3.1 Dimensions of financialisation  
Perhaps the most intuitive approach to identifying financialisation is to look at the size of the 
financial sector. This is most commonly measured relative to GDP, exemplified by scholars 
such as Foster and McChesney (2012, 18), Deutschmann (2011, 353) and Brenner (2002, 92). 
Looking at descriptive data, there is no doubt whatsoever that the size of the financial sector 
has multiplied several times in the last decades. The involvement of finance in households can 
be seen in the amount that is paid by households to the financial sector in the form of rents 
and interests, as well as in the share of households’ savings that is sourced in the financial 
sector (Epstein 2016, 326). Reduced purchasing powers due to i.e., stagnant wages in 
combination with ballooning house prices has reduced the number of households that are able 
to buy their own home in some countries. The reliance on finance as a source of savings is 
largely a result of dismantled public pension schemes, as well as the fact that pension funds 
based on financial products have the potential to see a high rate of return (Aalbers 2017, 545; 
A. Davis and Walsh 2017, 31). They also have the potential to disappear entirely as the result 
of a financial crash. 
 
A third dimension of financialisation is the shift in investment. As the financial sector 
becomes increasingly profitable, investments from the productive sector will shift towards the 
financial sector (Aalbers 2019, 5; Stockhammer 2004, 720). This dimension in particular 
highlights the importance of the distinction between the financial sector and the productive 
sector. Investments in the productive sector will produce something of fundamental value, 
whereas investments in the financial sector contributes to a gamble of money transfers in the 
hope of winning that gamble. Consequently, the effects of investments in the productive 
sector versus the financial sector are profoundly different, only the former can have any direct 
impact on people’s quality of life. Debt levels constitute the fourth dimension. If we are to 
study financialisation as increased debt we want to examine the increased use of debt to fund 
what had previously been funded my more stable sources such as income for households (ties 





(Brenner 2002, 284; Gemzik-Salwach 2017, 155; Magdoff and Sweezy 1987, 15; Palley 
2007, 6). Financial deregulation is the one dimension of financialisation I explore in my 
empirical work. It is therefore of vital importance how deregulation is conceptualised. Hence, 
a separate section is dedicated to conceptualising deregulation.  
 
2.4 Regulation and deregulation 
 
Deregulation refers to the removal of existing regulation. Such regulations are imposed in the 
first place by when public administrative offices, such as the department of finance and its 
suborganisations, sees dangers with letting the financial sector operate freely. A synonym to 
financial deregulation that is employed by some scholars is that of financial liberalisation. 
Deregulation, or liberalisation, occurs when those regulations are deemed redundant or 
damaging. This dimension has a single necessary and sufficient indicator, which is the event 
of removing regulation. This can reliably be detected from parliamentary or otherwise judicial 
documents that explicitly state the removal of some regulation regarding the financial sector. 
As this is a thesis of comparative politics engaging in political economy, the political element 
cannot be set aside. 
 
Though regulation and deregulation can easily be interpreted as the two conditions of a binary 
phenomenon, an important caveat lies in the absence of regulation. Both regulation and 
deregulation are active decisions made by policy-makers or the enforcing bureaucracy with 
the goal of creating some envisioned ideal environment (Winston 1993, 1263). However, the 
absence of regulation may often create the same end-scenario as deregulation, while 
remaining far more demanding to detect by researchers and other interested parties (United 
States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). Another way to put this is that if one 
wishes a certain level of aggregate freedom for the financial sector to operate, the financial 
sector will create more freedom for itself by inventing new financial products that circumvent 
existing regulation (Funk and Hirschman 2014, 696). The challenge with both regulating and 
measuring this is that the absence of regulation is essentially impossible to detect. Any data, 
regardless of whether it is quantitative or qualitative, would have to achieve the remarkable 






This is not just an impossible task for a single researcher, but it is a task that policy-makers 
and bureaucrats are battling at all times. While new regulation must be suggested, accepted, 
implemented and enforced by an intentionally slow machinery, new financial products are 
constantly invented and produces by the financial sector. As long as regulation is created as 
responses rather than in a fore sighting, preventive manner, the financial sector will always be 
one step ahead. Even if the goal to create preventive regulation was present, one would still be 
partaking in a tug-of-war with the armies of lawyers and other specialised personnel 
employed by the financial actors. It is not unreasonable to assume that a financial product 
created in 2004 might not be regulated until 2005, at which point a new financial product may 
have emerged. This happened prior to the financial crisis of 2008, when “shadow banks” 
emerged parallel to the regular banking system and beyond the reach of the existing 
regulatory framework (Elson 2017, 21). Though no data on absence of regulation is available 
– nor will it likely be available in the near future, given coding challenges – we can translate 
this caveat into the assumption that the financial sector likely is more liberal than we can 
detect from data on deregulation. This assumption is of course not strong enough to be taken 
into consideration when analysing data, but it appears plausible and likely enough to keep it in 
mind when studying financial sector deregulation. 
 
2.5 Gross domestic product and wage share of total income 
 
Finally, before turning to the theoretical framework, we should consider the two expected 
outcomes that are presented in the research question along with their operationalisations. For 
a brief moment, we should distinguish the expected outcomes from the dependent variables. 
The hypothesised outcomes are theoretical concepts, grounded in the wider literature. These 
are, respectively, economic growth and decreased share of that growth benefiting workers. 
The guiding principle for these two outcomes is the research question that guides this entire 
thesis: that financialisation has a dual effect on the economic system, one that benefits the 
wealthiest and detriments the workers. The wider economic growth and the workers’ share of 
said growth are the intensions of the respective outcomes. For the sake of analysis, these 






Gross domestic product (GPD) is by far the most commonly utilised metric for general 
economic wellbeing at a societal level. The extant usage of GDP translates into a unique 
opportunity to achieve commensurability at levels that can be seen in few other variables of 
social science. GDP is also used extensively in the financialisation literature to indicate 
economic growth. It is, however, vital to remember what exactly it measures. GDP is an 
aggregation of the value of all products and services for a given country and year. This means 
that it does not say anything about unemployment, wages, purchasing power, the environment 
or any other metric that perhaps is more relevant individual workers. A closer discussion on 
the implications of financial products as externalities to GDP can be found in section 3.7.1 of 
the next chapter. Its extant use and theoretical proximity to economic growth renders GDP a 
fruitful operationalisation. 
 
Key to the concept of workers’ livelihood is its relation to the larger economy. The idea is not 
to measure their individual wages, their purchasing power or health. The research question 
specifies workers share. It can thus be operationalised as the wage share of total income, a 
measurement on which there exists data. Wage share of total income (henceforth “wage 
share”) encompasses the proportion of total income that consists of wages to employed 
persons. Wage share perfectly captures the workers’ piece of the pie (“AMECO Database” 
2021). As it is measured as a share of total income, it measures the balance of total income’s 
components within a country. A higher wage share in country A does not necessarily indicate 
that workers in Country A are better off than in country B. It does tell us that workers of 
country A are receiving a large piece of the pie than in country B (Dünhaupt 2013, 3). As total 
income is extremely closely correlated to GDP, the latter will be used for data purposes later 
in the thesis. 
 
2.6 Summary  
 
Researching financialisation illustrates the importance of clear conceptualisation prior to 
analysis. This chapter has unpacked financialisation and its intensions as well as its various 
operationalisations. Five operationalisations are presented, where deregulation is discussed in 
more detail as it is the selected approach to measuring financialisation in this thesis. A clearer 





the theoretical framework as well as the specific theoretical elements employed in this thesis 






Chapter 3: Theoretical framework and literature review 
 
As emphasised in the previous chapter, how to define financialisation is no easy undertaking. 
In this chapter I present an overview of the literature on financialisation, along with key 
authors and major distinctions in their interpretation of financialisation. I first give a general 
presentation of financialisation, before more specifically presenting my two dependent 
variables: GDP and wage share. Finally, this thesis is situated into that literature. The 
contributions of this chapter are multitude. New research should build upon and communicate 
with previous research (Gerring 2012, 68). By presenting that previous research, we can better 
judge to what extent this thesis has succeeded in communicating with the extant literature on 
this topic. A main objective with this chapter is to foster a better understanding of the 
meaning of conceptualisation. While the conceptualisation chapter initiated that process, this 
chapter displays how others have interpreted financialisation and how it is reflected in real 
events and facts. I depict the historic evolution of this field of research. Possessing that 
history will enhance the readers’ ability to follow the rest of this thesis. With a better 
understanding of financialisation and the relevant literature, two hypotheses will be presented 
along with relevant causal mechanisms that may help explain the causal chain linking 
independent variables with dependent variables. 
 
3.1 A divided research field 
 
In the aftermath of any financial crisis or other major economic downturns, research 
inevitably attempt to explain that event. The explanations are numerous. I divide them into 
two primary non-exhaustive camps: orthodox and heterodox, in line with meta-analytical 
literature (Bortis 2016, 44). These two camps can be identified in every aspect of the 
disciplines of economics and political economy, although they are more commonly pointed 
out by heterodox authors (Sawyer 2013, 10), presumably for the simple reason that heterodox 
authors are a minority arguing against the majority. These camps can be identified by their 
approach to analysing economics, wherein heterodox scholar generally conducts research 
more critical to the status quo economic system, while orthodox scholars to a greater extent 





Different axioms of the fundamental mechanisms of economics divide them and create 
entirely opposing interpretations of economic and political events (Milonakis and Fine 2009, 
9). Importantly, the two camps often employ different terminology. The term 
“financialisation” is largely reserved for the critical, heterodox authors. Orthodox authors 
studying the same phenomena generally refer to this as “financial development”, “financial 
modernisation” or “financial reform” (Sawyer 2014, 12).  
 
None of the abovementioned terms necessarily indicate whether or not the financial sector is 
getting more or less regulated. Naturally, academic terms should not imply whether a certain 
concept is wanted or not, but it should tell us precisely what it is. In research on regulation, 
the term “financial modernisation” does not tell us whether it encompasses stricter or looser 
regulation. This means that, if one were to study financial assets as a share of household 
savings for instance – one dimension of finance that is viewed to be increasing by scholars of 
financialisation – it is not clear from “financial modernisation” whether one should expect an 
increase or a decrease in the share of household savings that is dedicated to financial assets.  
 
Despite this lack of terminological consistency, when surveying the literature I find that these 
terms “financial development”, “financial modernisation” and “financial reform” are 
predominantly used to indicate deregulation, a larger financial sector, a greater societal 
penetration by the financial sector and otherwise the same phenomenon that “financialisation” 
describes. As such, these terms blur the literature from academic clarity. As will be evident in 
the next chapter, this can cause challenges when some authors seem to be confused by how to 
interpret their own results. Contrary to this ambiguity, the term “financialisation” is distinctly 
used to describe a larger financial sector and the greater influence of that sector. This thesis 
will exclusively refer to this process as financialisation, in order to secure commensurability 
with the part of the literature that has established a clear terminology. 
 
The orthodox and heterodox approaches to financial crises and deregulation are presented in 
the following section. Note that there is residual research that does not fit into any of these 
two approaches. The following categorisation identifies schools of thought within each camp 
by their analysis of financialisation and crises, not by their analysis of the grand workings of 





authors characteristically differ widely in their interpretation of economic development – as 
the political left has historically been known to do – the orthodox authors are more united in 
their interpretation, for the same simple reason that defines them as orthodox: they believe the 
market functions as it should. After all, why bother fighting over how something fully 
functional works.  
 
3.2 Orthodox literature 
 
Orthodox economic theory is the historically and contemporary dominant interpretation of 
economics. It is defined by, among other things, a range of established assumptions about the 
economy1 and heavy use of mathematical modelling (Elson 2017, 59; Rochon and Rossi 
2016, 37). The general expectancy among orthodox authors is a positive relationship between 
economic growth and financialisation (Sawyer 2014, 12; Schumpeter 1911, 126). The idea is 
that the financial sector moves money from unproductive areas (households’ savings 
accounts) to productive investors via credit. Such transfers, where banks lend out the money 
deposited into savings accounts by users, secures that money is available where it has the 
greatest utility and can be used for productive investments, as opposed to sitting idle in 
someone’s mattress. A larger financial sector – by definition, as savings accounts and lending 
are key elements of financial services – means more opportunities to transfer said savings and 
a more productive economy. These transfers facilitate investment that creates jobs in all the 
steps of investment, for instance in construction, employment in operation of newly 
constructed facilities, and in the production of materials. (ref) 
 
This theoretical connection between financialisation and economic growth is supported by 
various empirical findings. Financialisation – or financial development, as it is dubbed in 
these papers – is understood by all these scholars as financial deregulation. Deregulation here 
refers to adjusting or removing regulatory policy that intends to restrict financial activity. A 
range of scholars find positive economic associations of deregulation, including lower 
 
1 While a full overview of these assumptions would be better fit for a book dedicated to that purpose, some key 
assumptions are that money is neutral (i.e., not a variable to be analysed, just a mediator), that there always is 
full employment, that the market has perfect competition, that people possess perfect rationality and that all 
individuals have full access to all information in order to make informed decisions (Foster and McChesney 2012, 





inequality (Beck, Levine, and Levkov 2010) and increased stability in the financial sector 
(Kaufman, Mote, and Rosenblum 1984). Stankov (2010) finds support for the general 
orthodox presumption that financial deregulation causes economic growth, as does Clarke 
(2004), though with data limited to the United States. Other positive findings are made by 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005), and Loaza and Ranciere (2005). Chava et al. look more 
specifically at financial regulation and find mixed results: some findings indicate that 
interstate deregulation increases economic growth, while other findings indicate the opposite 
effect (2013). Some other scholars find more negative associations of deregulation, though 
these are limited in abundance. Feldmann finds that general, without specifying financial 
sector, deregulation has a negative effect on unemployment and consequently a positive effect 
on economic growth (2012). 
 
All the empirical findings presented above are derived from some variation of quantitative 
analysis that, by the ontological nature of quantitative methods, is unable to prove the 
existence of a causal chain from independent to dependent variable. This is a key issue that 
will be further elaborated on and addressed later in this thesis. The conceptual challenge that 
these authors face lies in the interpretation of their own claim that “financialisation causes 
economic growth”. While this is certainly an interesting dimension of financialisation and the 
one I employ in this thesis, it is a restricted conceptualisation and as such the results should be 
interpreted along that restriction. It should in other words only be interpreted as financial 
deregulation as a dimension of financialisation, not as financialisation as a whole. By not 
specifying which dimension(s) they focus on, the research presented above commits the 
fallacy of equating their findings with all dimensions of financialisation. On the contrary, 
while heterodox authors face other challenges, their research is generally based on a far wider 
understanding of financialisation with clearer conceptual scope. As can be observed here, 
orthodox empiricism appears to be broad, with the general conclusion that financialisation is a 
net positive for society. In addition, methodological choices limit the ability to make causal 
inferences. Heterodox scholars see the conceptual issues of orthodox literature as an invitation 







3.3 Heterodox literature 
 
Heterodox economists are characterised by a more critical approach to capitalism, a less 
formalised or purist approach to the discipline of economics, and by the inclusion of social 
and political dimensions such as power, inequality and justice in their analyses (Bortis 2016, 
45; Rochon and Rossi 2016, 38). An important feature of the specific heterodox literature on 
financialisation is its largely theoretical nature. Few attempts have been employed to test 
heterodox theories. Influential scholars with this tradition are, among others, Epstein (2005), 
Toporowski (2018), Aalbers (2019), Magdoff and Sweezy (1987), Krippner (2005), and 
Stockhammer (2004) for their conceptual work. Financialisation as a concept is vague, broad 
and relatively young as a field of study. The fact that financialisation so recently has become 
a prominent field prompts conceptual clarifications before it can be studied empirically, 
which explains the narrow focus of research produced thus far (Sartori 1970, 1038). This also 
means that the amount of empiricism that has been conducted is strictly limited (Dünhaupt 
2013, 8; Krippner 2005, 175; Kus 2012, 478).  
 
The methodological distinctions between orthodox and heterodox authors highlighted is 
reflected in the existing literature on financialisation. Where orthodox authors have shown 
that financial deregulation associates positively with economic growth, heterodox authors ask 
more complex questions or questions of a more qualitative nature and thus make more 
descriptive conclusions. Studies have been conducted on such dimensions of financialisation 
as the shifting of firms’ investments from the productive to the financial sector (Aalbers 2019; 
L. E. Davis 2018; Rabinovich 2019; Stockhammer 2017; 2004), financial profits as a share of 
national profits (Bakir and Bahtiyar 2017, 256; Bresser-Pereira 2010, 506; Elson 2017, 165) 
and household savings in the financial sector (Aalbers 2019, 6), all of which confirm the 
existence of financialisation. Although the mentioned literature is empirical, it is largely 
descriptive and without any form of causal inference. This is a major shortcoming of the field 
that this thesis seeks to address. 
 
Another key gap found in the literature of both approaches is discovered as one delves into 
narrower research of the more specific dimensions of financialisation, such as deregulation. 





prior to decreases in wage share (Born 2011, 236; Bresser-Pereira 2010, 501; Glyn 2006, 54), 
a detailed description of the causal process and its components is still missing. Though the 
broad and complex topic of deregulation will be more thoroughly explored later in this 
chapter, it is quite obvious that regulation (and deregulation) tends to happen at a micro as 
well as a macro level. In other words, regulation concerns both grand activities such as 
foreign banks as a whole, as well as far smaller activities, such as the maximum permitted 
ratio of mortgage to income (Glyn 2006, 65). Additionally, the power of these regulations 
depends on many variables, such as bureaucratic funding, expertise of those working to 
enforce them, and even the precise wording of the regulation. The same challenges appear to 
anyone studying deregulation. If we are to determine if deregulation as a dimension of 
financialisation causes economic growth and decreased wage share, we need to identify which 
specific deregulations matter, and which do not. This requirement to identify the type of 
financial deregulation that matters is the primary inspiration for the research design 
employed in this thesis. 
 
While heterodox authors share a scepticism towards the idea of a free market, and they all see 
financialisation as a part of a larger process as opposed to an isolated event, there is still much 
diversity and disagreement between heterodox authors. Some schools of thought within this 
approach that can be identified by their nuanced differences in interpreting the workings of 
capitalism are the Social Structure of Accumulation school, New Marxists, Minskyans and 
Structural Keynesians. The general disagreement comes from whether financialisation is a 
result of neoliberalism – the far-reaching ideological shift that took place worldwide during 
the 1970s and 1980s in the direction of favouring less economic regulation – or if it is 
inherent to capitalism, which is defined as the economic system of supply and demand that 
has existed in major parts of the globe since the industrial revolution. Supporters of the latter 
view see financialisation as a necessary development of capitalism as it matures. These 
supporters are often dubbed stagnationist and will be examined further in the next section. 
 
Based on the literature review, the following are the main shortcomings of the extant 
literature of both camps. First, empiricism is limited to cross-case analyses that are unable to 
make causal inferences. Second, the empiricism that does exist lacks conceptual clarity, as 





does not explore financialisation at a conceptual level lower than its intension, in the sense of 
Sartori (1970, 1041). The underlying mechanisms that tie individual dimensions of 
financialisation to various macroeconomic variables are largely missing. This thesis seeks to 
remedy all three of these shortcomings with a multimethodological approach. The literature 
on financialisation is divided into and defined by the heterodox-orthodox cleavage that is 
found in all political economy and that has implications for the above shortcomings. With a 
broad theoretical foundation in mind, the next section outlines the process of financialisation 
which assists in creating a research design.  
 
3.4 The background to financialisation 
 
3.4.1 Stagnation 
Financialisation theory is rooted in the premise that post-19th century capitalism has a 
structural tendency towards stagnation, meaning that there will necessarily be 
underemployment of productive resources caused by insufficient effective demand and a 
dearth of profitable investment opportunities in the real economy (Magdoff and Sweezy 
1987).  
 
Stagnation occurs when either a market is satisfied and/or workers lose their ability to 
consume in that market, an inevitable development of capitalism (Bischoff, Krüger, and 
Lieber 2018, 154; Marx 1859). As the single rationale of capitalist behaviour is to accumulate 
wealth, this pushes capitalists to siphon as much profit as possible using one or more of the 
following methods: increasing market share, increasing prices or lowering costs (Foster and 
McChesney 2012, 30). The first of these has a fixed limit at 100% of the market. This is a 
challenging point to reach for a single business as it is generally reached through 
advertisements or acquisition of competitors, though it is far less challenging to come close to 
it, especially if one considers the common situations wherein a small number of businesses 
cooperate in controlling the market. As one approaches the finite limit that is 100% market 
share control, there is no more revenue to be made from this channel (Foster and McChesney 
2012, 32). The option of increasing prices does not have the same fixed ceiling, but has a 





increase would deter consumers. This should be considered in conjunction with the option of 
reducing costs, which often means automatization and wage reduction, both of which reduce 
the purchasing power of workers. When wages are pushed down or removed entirely, while 
prices are simultaneously increased, one will inevitably reach a saturation point. 
 
As capital continues to be concentrated into fewer hands, the purchasing power of the 
remaining population decreases (Aalbers 2019; Sawyer 2014, 6). A combination of the status 
quo inequality, increasing prices and decreasing or stagnant wages leave workers with a 
decreased ability to consume and thus also leave the owners of capital without profit. A 
change to any of these could increase consumption, but would simultaneously decrease profits 
per unit sold or per worker employed, and are therefore unwanted (Foster and McChesney 
2012, 38). This entire process of continued accumulation of wealth can be seen in contrast to 
the familiar strategy of Fordist political economy as pursued by many developed economies 
in the post-WWII era, wherein capitalists would push workers’ wages up so that they could 
purchase the same products they manufacture for the capitalist (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016, 
184). Accumulation of wealth and stagnation are positioned relative to financialisation in 





Figure 3.1: Ancestry tree of financialisation, showing its origin, the dimensions it 
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To maintain their previous profit rates, the financial sector can innovate new financial 
products to encourage investment by non-financial firms into the financial sector rather than 
the more traditional form of investment into expanded productive business, such as by adding 
employees or adding industrial machinery (Bresser-Pereira 2010, 516; Foster and McChesney 
2010, 30; Schumpeter 1911). A reminder is due that this narrative of stagnation is Marxist in 
nature. An (in)famous example of financial innovation from recent history is Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDO). This product allows financial institutions to sell not only individual 
debt papers to other financial institutions, but to sell them in large batches, which in turn are 
divided into three groups based on their risk level. The details of a CDO or any other specific 
financial product is unimportant for the time being – the point is that CDOs and other 
innovative financial products have allowed the financial institutions to broaden their market. 
CDOs first allowed banks to sell their mortgages much faster than previously. Then, as they 
added the risk tranches, they could again expand their market by capturing customers willing 
to take three different levels of risks. The result is more transactions and more revenue for the 
banks. A key feature of financial innovation is that the new products tend to be extremely 
complex and tailored around existing regulation. A parallel can be drawn to the 
manufacturing of synthetic narcotics which tend to be regulated by chemical composition, and 
which can be legally sold by introducing minor changes to that chemical composition. This is 
made possible with financial products by the armies of economists and lawyers that are 
involved in the innovation process, as a result of the absurd amounts of money that can 
potentially be made from new products. 
 
Returning to the problem of falling profitability due to increasingly accumulated wealth, by 
issuing debt to individual consumers through tools such as credit cards, car loans and 
mortgages, the financial sector can acquire more profit from interest rates while 
simultaneously artificially boosting workers’ purchasing power. This has the double effect of 
generating profit for the financial sector and for the productive businesses as they satisfy the 
debtors increased consumption (Glyn 2006, 53).  
 
However, although the real economy grows from the boost in debt-financed consumption, the 
financial sector will become an increasingly more profitable arena relative to the productive 





products such as stocks or bonds. This incentivises investors to move their capital into the 
financial sector, for the simple reason that it has the potential to generate higher profits 
(Foster and McChesney 2010, 5). As the financial sector receives more investment from the 
productive sector and as households both carry more debt and place their savings in financial 
products, the financial sector can be said to penetrate society to a larger extent than before. 
This is a crucial point, because it means that whatever happens in the financial sector will 
have effects rippling through society.  
 
3.4.2 Instability 
The financial sector is inherently unstable (Bresser-Pereira 2010, 511; Rabionet 2016; Sawyer 
2014, 10). It is a market characterised by speculation and gambling – a rather grim, but 
uncontroversial depiction among political economists, although stock traders and other 
likeminded professionals might argue the opposite (Moran 1991, 7). Profits from financial 
products are generally – with the exception of fees placed on a range of services – made from 
buying them at some point in time and selling them at another point in time, where the 
difference in price make out the profits (or loss) (Foster and McChesney 2012, 53). This is a 
process that depends on there being both winners and losers. As is commonly known from the 
casino industry, a continued gamble will eventually result in loss for the gambler and profits 
for the gamemasters. In the financial sector, this mechanism of margin maximisation 
translates into continued transactions that build up enormous wealth among few people, and 
then an inevitable collapse of said wealth’s value at some later date. This is of course a natural 
part of the financial cycle that has historically been seen by outsiders as none of their 
business. However, financial penetration of the real economy makes this a problem for 
countless individuals, households, and businesses outside the financial centres.   
 
3.4.3 Neoliberalism 
The narrative of financialisation presented above is championed by some scholars – those 
who view capitalism as a stagist process wherein financialisation manifests as the latest stage 
(although there are differences in how distinct that stage and the ones before it should be 
viewed, as some see the development of capitalism as more gradual (Foster 2007, 1; Sawyer 





presented narrative serves as historical context which helps us in understanding how 
deregulation as a dimension of financialisation has increased in frequency and scope in the 
past few decades.  
 
The dangers of such instability in the financial sector and the possibility of a collapse has led 
to financial regulation being introduced to varying degrees all around the world, particularly 
so during the so called “Golden Age of Capitalism” from 1945 to 1970 (Bresser-Pereira 2010, 
503). This period was marked by high fiscal intervention and strict market regulations, 
including regulations on financial activities. Consequently, the number of economic crises 
was low, relative to later periods (Shachmurove 2011, 224). This changed radically with the 
advent of neoliberalism – the ideological world view where free markets were supreme – in 
the 1970s (Crotty 2009, 564; A. Davis and Walsh 2017, 27). As neoliberal actors were elected 
into office around the globe, spearheaded by Ronald Reagan in the United States and 
Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, financial regulations were eased at a large scale. 
Potentially as a consequence, the 1970s and 1980s saw an increase in the frequency of 
financial crises (Brenner 2002, 42; Bresser-Pereira 2010, 504).  
 
The rise of neoliberal ideology in politics and in academia should not be seen as some event 
occurring in a vacuum. As capital accumulated into fewer hands and workers’ purchasing 
powers diminished, numerous national economies witnessed stagnation and its consequences 
(Foster and McChesney 2012, 59). One of these consequences is seen in reduced GDP 
growth. However, recall from the discussion on conceptualisation that GDP does not 
necessarily measure best the quality of life for the general population. The inclusion of 
financial products disconnected from any productive value means that changes in GDP may 
potentially be better felt by wealthy individuals with large financial assets than by the median 
household (Sawyer 2014, 9).  
 
As national economies started to enter the phase of stagnation in the 1979s to 1990s, 
financialisation in general and deregulation in particular became increasingly viable as a route 
to maintaining or returning to economic growth. However, financial deregulation is a wide 
term that covers highly diverging activities, from requiring reporting of transactions in order 





same time. Whereas Sawyer, Foster and McChesney, and other scholars point to deregulation 
as a key component of financialisation, there is still uncertainty regarding which specific 
types of deregulations are relevant for financialisation. A discussion on the various aspects of 
deregulation that could potentially be fruitful for the analysis is provided next.  
 
3.5 Theoretical specification for this thesis 
 
By now it should be clear that financialisation is a broad and rather vague concept. This 
section will clarify which specific aspect of financialisation is analysed further, why that 
choice is made and which contributions I make to the literature.  
 
Out of the many elements of financialisation, I choose to study deregulation. This choice is 
based on the research gap that has been uncovered in conducting the literature review. 
Deregulation as a dimensions of financialisation has significantly poorer coverage of 
qualitative, empirical evidence That gap is the absence of qualitative research and the 
consequent absence of tested mechanisms linking deregulation to the dependent variables. We 
have seen that not only is empiricism limited, but theoretical development on a mechanistic 
level is also missing. This thesis contributes to filling that gap by studying financial 
deregulation with a methodological approach that has extremely limited history in 
financialisation literature, and by testing mechanisms that until now are purely theoretical 
with no case-specific empiricism. In addition to the ability to unpack the mechanisms, a 
small-N study such as is conducted in the second half of this thesis has the benefit of 
achieving high conceptual validity, meaning that the data better reflective the intended 
concepts than if one did a large-N study (George and Bennett 2005, 19). This is an important 
benefit when dealing with such complex concepts as financialisation. 
 
This thesis builds on the excellent analyses conducted by Bresser-Pereira (2010) and Foster & 
McChesney (2012). While their contributions to the literature have been wide in the sense that 
they have touched upon multiple dimensions of financialisation, including deregulation, their 
primary role in this thesis is to serve as a conceptual framework for identifying 
financialisation. Bresser-Pereira provides a far more detailed discussion of deregulation 





contributions to the literature can be positioned in the New Marxist school which bases its 
understanding of financialisation on the background of stagnation. This thesis makes that 
same presumption about the origin of financialisation – a key presumption on which the 
mechanisms introduced at a later stage is logically dependent on. For that reason, this thesis 
also fits in the New Marxist school. 
 
Among the many consequences of financialisation, economic growth and decreased wage 
share are the focus of this thesis and thus also the dependent variables. They are selected for 
their role in financialisation theory as not only common consequences, but as highly 
impacting consequences. GDP is in many political and academic arenas the default 
macroeconomic metric that is sought to understand and to increase. Despite what has been 
said already about GDP not necessarily reflecting the life quality of workers, they are 
connected regardless. Achieving economic growth thus becomes a central theme for the 
general population and in elections. Given the backdrop of stagnation, financialisation can be 
viewed as a solution to the problem of stagnation (Foster and McChesney 2012, 30). On the 
other hand, many scholars – including those that view financialisation as a solution – also see 
a potential economic collapse in the long term. It is in other words seen as a V-shaped 
solution (Bresser-Pereira 2010, 511). The uncertainty of the effect of financialisation on GDP 
prompts a closer analysis. The first hypothesis thus becomes: 
 
H1: Financial deregulation causes increased GDP. 
 
Another central feature of financialisation that has been debated widely is its effect on wages 
(Bresser-Pereira 2010; Dünhaupt 2012, 484; Foster and McChesney 2012, 31; Stockhammer 
2017). Multiple directions and mechanisms are discussed in the literature with indications that 
wages are negatively affected, but with little empirical attempts at making causal inferences 
of this relationship. Where GDP captures a grand trend reaching every aspect of society, 
including the wealthiest, wages are more directly relevant to the majority of the population. 
As such, it generates a second hypothesis for this thesis: 
 






My contribution to the literature on wage share is primarily methodological. Previous 
research has exclusively been theoretical or correlational. The field would benefit greatly 
from both the causal conclusions and the case-specific knowledge that can be generated from 
case studies, both of which are provided in this thesis. The two hypotheses researched here 
capture important potential effects of financialisation. These are not competing hypotheses, 
but complementary ones, meaning that the confirmation of one does not prompt automatic 
rejection of the other. Mechanisms for both hypotheses are found in section 3.7. 
 
While an increased GDP is generally agreed upon by the broader population to be desired, the 
opposite can be said of a decrease in the wage share. The connection between the two 
dependent variables is complex. On the one hand, one can envision a scenario in which the 
increase in GDP negates the decrease in wage share, resulting in a larger purchasing power 
for labourers. On the other hand, as was touched upon in the conceptualisation of GDP, there 
is a possibility that the increase in GDP is purely beneficial to financiers. As such, many may 
view the theoretically grounded anticipated effects of financialisation to be generally 
undesirable. Scholars of financialisation should aspire for transparency of the normative 
element that necessarily exists in these macroeconomic trends (Bennett and Checkel 2014a, 
264). Yet, the goal here is not to explain the advent of economic growth or wage share, nor is 
it to evaluate to what extent financialisation is desirable. Recall that financialisation is viewed 
by some New Marxists as a potential solution to the persistent threat of stagnation, while 
others look to a third alternative in entirely replacing the economic system with one that does 
not have the same level of fragility as capitalism. It is of course far beyond the scope of this 
thesis to address which economic system is the optimal one. However, this thesis should 
highlight one of the many issues of capitalism that has to be considered in the debate on how 
to organise the global and national economies. I do so by testing the effects of deregulation as 




Financial deregulation necessarily implies opening up to some new form of financial activity 
that is seen as being risky to some extent or otherwise unwanted, hence why it had been 





financial deregulation refers to the removal of existing regulation. The perhaps most well-
known case of deregulation in recent history is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the United 
States which effectively repealed and thus deregulated the pre-existing Glass-Steagall Act 
(Cassidy 2009, 229). To illustrate the many forms deregulation may take, this section presents 
a few common categories of deregulation along with some potential effects of said changes.  
 
In the following section I present three examples. First, reserve requirements for banks 
(Skidelsky 2018, 318). All banks are required to hold a certain ratio - usually of capital 
relative to that which they issue in loans. This ratio is usually found in the area of 5 – 20%, 
meaning that a minimum of said percentage of the lent amount must be held by the bank at all 
times (Lepers 2018, 4). Lower reserve requirements implies that banks are allowed to issue 
more loans based on the same capital they held prior to deregulation. This has three drastic 
consequences: (1) an increase in the total amount of issued debt in the economy, regardless of 
whether the debtor is another financial institution, a business, a household or a government, 
(2) the banks’ now increased amount of issued loans may serve as leverage when they 
themselves get loans from other financial institutions and (3) they will thus have a lower 
leverage-to-loan ratio should their issued loans collapse (Glocker 2021). In other words: If 
bank A uses its mortgages as leverage to get bigger loans from bank B and those mortgages 
are not paid by the homeowners to whom they belong due to i.e. increased unemployment, 
bank A now has a greater debt than before the liberalisation and the same fixed capital. This, 
naturally, means that bank A will go bankrupt. Depending on the size of that bank and its 
interconnectedness with other financial and non-financial entities, this could cause a greater 
collapse beyond its own offices. 
 
A second example of financial deregulation is the easing requirements of transparency in the 
financial institutions’ activities. This ties in with the literature on tax evasion and tax havens. 
By loosening the requirements for institutions to provide reports and insight to legislators, 
bureaucrats, media and society at large, these institutions might commit to even riskier 
behaviour than prior to deregulation. In the aftermath of the Great Recession, it was 
discovered that many of the big banks in the United States had utilised so called shadow 
banks. These were clandestine, financial entities owned by the banks in order to transfer 





banks themselves were required to be transparent, but avoided that requirement by utilising 
the shadow banking system and consequently also avoided reprimands for keeping these risky 
assets (Bresser-Pereira 2010, 506; Skidelsky 2018, 325). While this was not an example of 
deregulation, it shows the importance of transparency which itself is a key element in 
regulations and thus is also a potential target for deregulation. It also shows that a stagnant 
regulatory system should be considered as equivalent to deregulation, as the financial sector 
uncovers ways around existing regulation. Unfortunately for scholars of financialisation, 
measuring the absence of regulation in situations where the financial sector already has 
invented new financial products is essentially impossible. 
 
Third, interconnectedness: financial institutions become more interconnected by e.g., 
increasing the frequency and size of loans to each other, or through common ownership as a 
result of acquisitions and mergers (OECD 2011, 29). This was one of the activities that was 
made legal by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act (Funk and Hirschman 2014, 678). While 
these relationships concern the interconnectedness between banks, there is also increasing 
interconnectedness between the financial sector and society at large. Pension fund schemes, 
for instance, rely on financial products as a source of maintaining and increasing the fund 
value. As government-controlled schemes are dismantled and private savings become 
insufficient to secure a comfortable retirement, households are becoming more dependent on 
entering the financial sector in the hope for more lucrative gains on their savings.  
 
A financial sector that decades ago was relatively isolated from the real economy would also 
isolate its own instability to only affect the individuals that actively chose to work with 
finance. Household savings and pension fund schemes interconnected with the financial 
sector cause more normal people to be affected by the normal booms and busts of the 
financial sector, which in turn means that a large part of the population is at a constant risk of 
losing their lifesavings and livelihood. As a cherry on top, the lack of income households may 
face as a result of a financial crisis and correspondingly unemployment also results in 
decreased consumption, which in turn leads to a worse off economy. 
 






This section seeks to lay the groundwork for the later analysis, starting with a brief note on 
methodological considerations. Given the wide variety of mechanisms at play and uncertainty 
regarding their role in affecting GDP and wage share, a nested analysis is used to reduce said 
uncertainty. An isolated regression of deregulation or other dimensions of financialisation on 
the relevant independent variables can easily overlook important nuances that determine the 
scope and effect of financialisation. A preliminary regression on various categories of 
deregulation, followed by a within-case process tracing based on the regression results will go 
a long way in shedding light on the mechanisms of financialisation. The methodological 
design will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
Despite limitations in the literature, some mechanisms linking financialisation to GDP and 
wage share are proposed. It is the lack of empirical testing of these mechanisms that still 
render them “proposed”. These are presented here so that their origins, content, and 
implications are better understood when they are examined in depth at a later stage. Keep in 
mind that nested nature of this analysis requires manoeuvring back and forth between 
research design, theory development and analysis. A central feature of nested analyses, and 
also one of the major benefits to such an approach, is the circularity or feedback loop that 
characterises the research design. A more detailed discussion on nested analysis is provided in 
section 4.1, but can be briefly summarised as a combined study employing both quantitative 
and qualitative analyses. The theoretical findings in sections 3.1 – 3.6 of this chapter are used 
in designing both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. That design does in turn require 
mechanisms which are accordingly discussed in section 3.7 (i.e., the present section). This 
thesis is nevertheless organised into themed chapters, rather than in the chronological order of 
the research process which would make for a less pleasurable reading experience. The 
mechanisms are discussed here as a part of the theoretical groundwork for the thesis, but 
could not be found until probing of the qualitative case had been conducted. Deregulation of 
entry barriers to foreign banks will thus be the key type of deregulation to be examined in 
depth.  
 
A total of six mechanisms are employed (do you mean examined/explored?) in this thesis, 
half of which attempt to explain an increase in GDP and half of which attempt to explain a 





relevance to financial deregulation. The first five are adopted from central contributors to 
financialisation literature, while the final mechanism is a novel contribution by myself, 
though it is developed by combining mechanisms one and two of wage share.  
 
3.7.1 Mechanisms of GDP 
The first mechanism views financial support apparatuses as contributing to economic growth. 
According to Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Min, the entry of foreign banks into a country in 
which they previously could not operate requires an expansion of the support apparatus 
providing necessary services for foreign banks to operate (1998, 9). One such central business 
that foreign banks require is rating agencies (Skidelsky 2018, 328). In order for both foreign 
and domestic banks to have their products valued, they need to be rated by a rating agency. 
These are also a part of the umbrella term “financial sector”, but are separated from banks to 
maintain legitimacy as a neutral, third-party evaluator, securing fair trade of financial 
products. Another service foreign banks will require is judicial counselling. This might 
manifest into lawyers hired directly by the banks themselves, or it could manifest into 
external law firms specialised in financial law. While some of these may already be present 
where the foreign banks establish their offices, the increased workload that new, large scale 
actors may be enough to observe expansions in the support apparatus.  
 
Consider also the fact that foreign banks likely will bring with them a complexity different to 
that of domestic banks. The most apparent illustration of this is that foreign banks generally 
are regulated by separate law, and thus require expertise specifically on foreign banking. Any 
type of business whose services are directly required by the foreign banks to provide their 
own banking services should be considered when testing this mechanism. The expansion of 
the support apparatus represents a magnifying effect, where foreign banks lie at the centre and 
the support apparatus expands outwards as the needs of foreign banks can be profited from. 
Just how large of an expansion one could expect as an approximate ratio to the size of the 
foreign banks is not specified by Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Min. However, one can expect 
that foreign bank entry will see far greater contributions to economic growth than one can 
expect from just the bank itself. As the services of the support apparatus are used, they should 
contribute to increasing GDP. The values of financial products are generally extremely high 





impact on GDP. Although some financial services are not included in the calculation of GDP, 
the type of services provided by the support apparatus are included2 and can thus contribute to 
economic growth. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Min propose a second mechanism: employment in the financial 
sector (Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Min 1998, 9). As with the introduction of any new 
business to the economy, foreign banks bring staff to operate their services. Herein lies an 
important distinction from the first mechanism: whereas the support apparatus is theorised to 
contribute through the value of their services, this second mechanisms concerns the 
employees of banks as well as of the support apparatus. These are related, yet distinct 
mechanisms. Hiring employees, particularly if their staff is international – which would mean 
entirely new, highly educated, and ready to work individuals from outside the domestic work 
pool – but also local employees would give a large number of man-years to the national 
economy (Foster and McChesney 2012, 58). This is essentially the classic argument of 
employment as a conductor of economic growth – an argument regularly associated with 
Keynes and now targeted to finance (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016, 176; Bortis 2016, 65). 
Workers earn an income from their jobs in the newly established or expanded financial sector, 
spend that income on general consumption in their lives and GDP rises as a result.  
 
A third mechanism explaining the effect of foreign banks on GDP is through Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) (Levine 1996, 237). FDI refers to movement of capital from one country to 
another in the form of productive investments, not as simple bank account transfers. Foreign 
banks are presumably large actors internationally or at least in their country of origin, hence 
they should have both the ability and the desire to expand into foreign countries. As such, one 
can reasonably assume that these are firms with much available capital. Smaller banks will 
likely be preoccupied with securing a stable customer base in their domestic market with 
which they are familiar. While the direct transfer of capital from the headquarters to the newly 
established foreign bank does not contribute to GDP in the target country, investment made 
 
2 The full list of financial services and products included in the calculation of GDP, with the exclusion of real 
estate and related revenue, are: Central bank business, bank business, banks’ rent margins, securities funds, life 
insurances, other damage insurances, car insurances, reinsurances, pension funds, sucrities brokering, mediation 
profits, services tied to credit business, financing business and insurance business, and fund management 





possible by said available capital does contribute. New opportunities to acquire and more 
competition on the lending side which pushes down interest rates are two factors that will 
facilitate individuals and businesses to invest in the real economy. That investment may then 
be used in building factories, which creates jobs in both construction and factory operation. 
Though Levine does not express full support of his own suggested mechanism in the context 
of developing countries, that scepticism is dependent on conditions tied to the nature of 
developing countries and as such cannot necessarily be transferred to developed countries 
under examination here (1996, 238).   
 
 
Figure 3.2: An overview of the proposed mechanisms linking foreign bank entry to economic 
growth. 
 
Support apparatus, employment and foreign direct investment are three potential paths from 
financial deregulation allowing for foreign bank entry to an increase in GDP. That is not to 
say that they are only paths that could possibly exist. However, these are key mechanisms 





weakened by the lack of support. While a theory-oriented research design could contribute 
with novel mechanisms, that is beyond the scope of this thesis. The task at hand is to test 
existing mechanisms. Though these three are not mutually exclusive, they are still 
theoretically distinct, meaning that they should be possible to observe on independently. 
Rejection of one mechanism will strengthen the likelihood that another mechanism is more 
relevant. 
 
3.7.2 Mechanisms of wage share 
By utilising the framework of growth models, we can derive the first mechanistic relationship 
between foreign bank entry and a decreased wage share. Central contributions are made to the 
literature on growth models by Baccaro and Pontusson in their analysis that include the credit-
led growth model (2016, 186). This describes a scenario where economic growth is a result of 
consumption which in turn is enabled by increased credit availability. Credit-led growth 
should not be confused with finance-led growth; the former is based on credit specifically and 
is employed here, whereas the latter is based on all financial products disconnected from 
consumption and otherwise the real economy. Finance-led growth will be discussed in detail 
later in this chapter (in section?).  
 
Baccaro and Pontusson do not present their analysis explicitly as a mechanism of financial 
deregulation. However, they present a process containing the same variables as are employed 
here. They point to changes in the wage-to-credit ratio underlying consumption as a result of 
financialisation and a consequently larger financial sector. If foreign bank entry causes the 
financial sector to grow, Baccaro and Pontusson’s work will be relevantly applied to this 
thesis. The theoretical framework provided by Foster and McChesney assist in situating 
credit-led growth in the financialisation literature, where it can clearly be seen as a component 
of financialisation with consequences for the wage share (Foster and McChesney 2012, 58).  
 
A growing financial sector is theorised to accompany more opportunities for utilising loans in 
financing investment or basic consumption, not unlike the process described the third 
mechanism of economic growth (Skidelsky 2018, 54). However, the aim here is to continue 
that process and examine its consequences. As loans become increasingly defining of an 





goods and services (Glyn 2006, 53; Skidelsky 2018, 303).The illusion that workers’ standard 
of living is unaffected or even enhanced prevents them from organising and demanding 
higher wages. If they simultaneously continue consumption, the economy and total income 
will continue to grow. These two factors in conjunction foster an economy in which the wage 
share is reduced.    
 
Stockhammer proposes the second mechanism regarding wage share by examening the shift 
in investment by the productive sector (2017, 10). Businesses will as a general rule seek to 
maximise their profit, and one central method of doing so is to invest revenue into new 
facilities as well as employees (Glyn 2006, 55; Skidelsky 2018, 310). This has historically 
been the default expansionary route. Certain businesses will expand onto other markets as 
they grow, at which point they are better known as conglomerates rather than businesses. 
However, regardless of whether they switch to new offices, add new offices at a new location 
or decide to get involved in another market than their original one, these are all options within 
the productive sector.  







Contrasting this is the option of investing revenue in the financial sector. Key deterrents 
investing in finance in the first place are the instability of the financial sector and the 
specialised knowledge required to make profitable investments outside the area a business 
already is established in. However, should the financial sector become significantly more 
profitable than any opportunities in the real economy, deterrents would be swept away (Glyn 
2006, 142). This chain of events generally dubbed a shift in investment by non-financial firms 
is a real phenomenon that other scholars have already shown to take place (L. E. Davis 2018, 
271; Epstein 2016, 328). An anecdotal and somewhat well-known example is that of Tesla, 
the car manufacturing corporation that sources far more of its revenue from financial products 
than they do from selling cars (Ramey 2021). This process is partly a result of the stagnation 
tendencies of capitalism discussed earlier, as well as the ever-growing financial sector size 
which in turn generates highly profitable investment opportunities. In other words, it is the 
result of financialisation, in addition to being a component of continued financialisation itself.  
 
The linking element between a shift in investment and a decreased wage share lies in 
businesses’ dependency on workers. As financial assets become a more dominating source of 
revenue than productive business, workers may no longer possess the same powers through 
collective organisation as they used to before financialisation (Dünhaupt 2013, 3; 
Stockhammer 2017, 10). Redundant workers have strongly diminished opportunities to 
bargain their wages. As a result, the wage share is reduced. 
 
Finally, a third and novel mechanism is constructed from combining the mechanisms one and 
two of wage share. Central to this mechanism is the assumption that a significant portion of 
financial products are disconnected from real value. If the calculation of GDP includes 
financial products and financial products are disconnected from the real economy – both of 
which we have already seen – then it should be possible to achieve economic growth purely 
as a result of financial growth while maintaining a stagnant real economy. In other words, it 
should be possible to encounter economic growth that workers simply do not experience the 






Consider for instance a pension fund relying on securities, bonds, and stocks to grow its 
value. If these products increase in price as a result of some collective psychological event – 
such as a national government endorsing it – the fund will be valued higher and will have 
contributed to GDP purely from a price speculations (Bresser-Pereira 2010, 505). This price 
increase does not contribute to society in any productive way whatsoever. Money will shift 
hands, but no productive value will be created. A rising GDP (and thus also gross domestic 
income) combined with stagnant wages is thus possible and would lead to a decrease in the 
wage. If this mechanism is found to be present, that would contribute to the already 
widespread critique against using GDP as a measure of wellbeing. More importantly for this 




This chapter has presented a theoretical backdrop that explains the theme of the thesis, 
justifies the research design and contributes with vital components to parts of the upcoming 
analysis. An overview of the existing literature with key contributions has been presented to 
better situate this thesis into a larger field of research. In doing so, a research gap was 
uncovered which inspired and necessitated the research design employed here. That design is 
one that test causal mechanisms, as such testing is missing from the existing literature. The 
specific literature relevant to financial deregulation, economic growth and decreased wage 
share has been discussed, along with potential causal mechanisms tied to the foreign bank 
entry-dimension of deregulation that will be central to conducting process tracing at a later 
stage. In the next chapter I conduct a regression analysis on the various dimensions of 







Chapter 4: Quantitative analysis and case selection 
 
In this chapter I discuss some methodological choices, I present my quantitative data and 
analysis, and I present the process of data selection. The reason for this grouping of three 
moderately distinct topics lies in the nature of the multimethod approach. The method is 
chosen based on the needs of financialisation literature as presented in the previous chapter. 
This method requires further elaboration before any analysis is conducted, so that the analysis 
is seen in its wider context. That analysis then ties directly into case selection. Both the 
regression and the case selection are prerequisites for conducting process tracing at a later 
stage. This apparent interconnectedness between methodology, regression and case selection 
would make for a fragmented thesis with less clarity of all three components. A closer 
discussion of the multimethod approach is presented next. 
 
4.1 A nested approach 
 
In this thesis I conduct a nested analysis, a variation of multimethod approaches. I first 
conduct a preliminary quantitative analysis and employ those results in case selection and in a 
qualitative process tracing analysis. This approach has multiple advantages which makes it a 
particularly suitable one for my thesis. The advantages and disadvantages of my approach will 
be outlined next, followed by an assessment of the technical details of my quantitative data 
and regressions. The regression results are then analysed and utilised in case selection, paving 
the way for process tracing. 
 
A nested analysis is a joint, sequential analysis using both quantitative and qualitative tools 
(Lieberman 2005, 436). Though it is not a necessary condition, they are usually conducted in 
that order. A central element to this approach and also the basis for selecting nested analysis 
in this thesis is the way in which the two components (quantitative and qualitative) cover the 
other’s shortcomings. Quantitative research excels at across-case validity and comparing 
cases to determine which one is more or less likely to contain the causal effect. Qualitative 
research excels at within-case validity. if one were to use a quantitative analysis. In 





dependent variables, I can select my qualitative case based on the presence or absence of 
covariance and I can test that covariance with high reliability on a single qualitative case.  
 
All researchers experience scarcity of time, money and human capital. Employing multiple 
methods in a single project would require those resources to be allocated to a larger surface 
area. While some may view this as a negatively affecting the quality of the analyses, I argue 
that this is incorrect. As long as the research values academic integrity and displays honesty in 
the scope of the findings, there is no effect on the quality of the analyses. For the purpose of 
this thesis, a pure single-case study would perhaps allow for testing a higher number of 
dimensions of financialisation. That would certainly be valuable ceteris paribus. However, it 
would not make the quality of that analysis any better than the one conducted here. The result 
is that my findings can only draw conclusions on financialisation as deregulation in my case, 
which is an entirely valid conclusions if the analysis is conducted in accordance with 
academic standards. The sacrificed scope of that conclusion is accepted for the benefit of a 
preliminary quantitative analysis. 
  
The advantages of nested analyses become visible in research fields where the theoretical 
foundation for qualitative research is unsatisfactory. Where theory development is still in its 
infancy, quantitative methods can be employed deductively to determine which aspects of a 
concept are worth looking into and it can help determine which cases are valuable for an in 
depth analysis (Lieberman 2005, 443). Both case selection and determination of concept 
dimension are valuable contributions of quantitative to qualitative research, independent of 
which criteria are set in determining case and dimension. A least-likely, most-likely case or 
some other case can be determined from quantitative research. Using this information, a 
researcher is well equipped for continuing onto a qualitative analysis (Gerring 2007, 185). 
 
The process of conducting nested analysis is somewhat circular, depending on which results 
one gets. A state-of-the-art illustration of this is provided by Lieberman in figure 4.1. There 
we can see that the results of a preliminary quantitative analysis – or Large-N Analysis in the 
words of the original author – are assessed, employed in creating a qualitative analysis which 
is then assessed again relative to the quantitative results. This is exactly what is done in this 





more than the left half of figure 4.1. If the findings from process tracing are in line with the 
statistical findings then we can safely end the analysis and strengthen the theory. If they 
findings do not match, we would have to re-state the quantitative model. The limitations of 
this thesis allows only for identifying such a mismatch and make recommendations for future 
scholars. As will be demonstrated in the rest of this thesis, I end up on “Do Model-building” 
and make recommendations on what a more accurate model may look like, in accordance 
with my findings. 
  
 
Figure 4.1: Overview of the nested analysis approach, adopted from Lieberman (2005, 437). 
 
4.2 Quantitative data 
 
This section presents the data used in the regression and discusses potential concerns 





opportunity to critically engage with my findings beyond simply accepting the conclusions I 
draw in the end.  
 
4.2.1 Challenges with coding financialisation 
A key characteristic of the financialisation literature is how recently it has emerged, both as a 
political-economic phenomenon and as a research field. Being an immature research area 
associated with certain challenges addressed at different points of this thesis – such as the 
challenges with conceptualisation discussed earlier in this thesis and challenges with micro-
level mechanisms explaining the effect of the financialisation. When studying financialisation 
as deregulation of the financial sector, it becomes apparent that few attempts have been made 
to decipher which types of deregulation matters. Regulation is a political tool which’s targeted 
activities ranges from maximum or minimum transfers amounts of some financial product, to 
complete bans on certain activities. Consequently, deregulation comes in equally varied 
forms. This means that studies of deregulation as a single concept risk negating any positive 
effect on GDP from one type of deregulation with the negative effect of another.  
 
One way to approach this challenge is to perform a regression analysis with different types of 
deregulations as independent variables. The result can help distinguish the different effects 
and point us to the most interesting type of deregulation, which in turn creates a good 
foundation from which to start process tracing. However, a regression analysis is only as good 
as its data, and the data related to deregulation are scarce and limited. Deregulations are 
difficult to categorise. The judicial documents that define them do not necessarily contain the 
terms “deregulation” or “financial liberalisation”. This creates challenges in both tracking 
them down and in analysing their content. Coding the judicial documents requires high level 
knowledge of the respective national financial system, political system as well as the language 
in which the documents are written. The combination of a non-English language that might be 
foreign to the researcher and infamously vague financial language creates a barricade that few 
scholars have the funding to traverse. The result is that there exists little quantitative data on 
deregulation. If one should manage to collect information on deregulations across states, one 







A final caveat to quantitative research on financialisation and deregulation is that regulation – 
as with many political topics – follows a global trend. The trend for financial regulation has 
been continuous deregulation since the 1970s and 1980s. Any dataset on this topic will thus 
contain limited variety, as a significant portion of country-years saw national deregulations. 
 
4.2.2 Data employed in the thesis 
Despite the above challenges, Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel make a valiant effort at creating 
a cross-sectional time-series (also known as pseudo-panel) dataset on financial deregulation, 
entitled Financial Reform (2010). The Reform-dataset will be utilised in this paper to conduct 
a regression analysis where its various operationalisations of financial deregulation serve as 
independent variables. In addition to being the most suitable dataset of its kind for my thesis, 
this is also by far the most cited dataset on financial deregulation. Although that alone cannot 
tell us anything about its content or value, it does allow this thesis to better communicate with 
the existing literature. Comparisons between research are best done where the same data is 
used. Other existing datasets on financial deregulation are Nicoletti et al. (2001), Akinci and 
Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) and Cerutti et al. (2016). These are all rejected due to far inferior 
data coverage in comparison to the Reform-dataset. Data on growth of GDP (“GDP Growth 
(Annual %)” n.d.) and wage share of total income (“AMECO Database” 2021) are added 
from external datasets to serve as dependent variables, both of which are chosen in line with 
the theoretical foundation for this paper. The units for this dataset are country-years, created 
from every unique combination of countries and years, resulting in units such as Spain-2001, 
Spain-2002 and France-2001.  
 
The studied sample is limited to OECD-member states3. This is primarily done for theoretical 
reasons; financialisation is a concept of late-stage capitalism (Foster and McChesney 2012, 
39; Magdoff and Sweezy 1987, 10). Some authors explicitly point to OECD as an important 
arena for financialisation (Glyn 2006, 65). Recall from the theoretical chapter that 
financialisation is a phenomenon that emerged as a reaction to limited sources of income in 
 
3 The complete list of included countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea (South), Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 





the real economy, as wages and prices hit a saturation point where an increase or decrease in 
either cannot bring new revenue to the capitalists. This situation can only emerge where 
capitalism has ravaged for a considerable time (Foster and McChesney 2012, 32). This 
description of a modern and deeply rooted capitalist structure is primarily reflected in OECD-
member states. By definition of membership, OECD-members have highly developed 
economies and consequently a large financial sector. This can easily be confirmed by 
studying a list of states ranked by size of the financial sector relative to GDP (“Bank Assets to 
GDP - Country Rankings” 2021). The addition of control variables limits the temporal range 
of the data to 1991 to 2005. Though some range is sacrificed in the early end for the sake of 
better coverage of variables, the dataset does in fact end in 2005. It would be interesting to 
study the continued effect of financialisation into the Great Recession of 2008 and the years 
after, but no such dataset currently exists. The final count of units is n = 435.  
 
Cross-sectional time-series data have the benefit of capturing more variation than any of its 
two dimensions can achieve on separately. Selecting this type of data can often be necessary 
when studying phenomena at a national level as an efficient way to achieve a sufficiently high 
number of units (Thomas, Vera E, and Philip 2005, 329). If we were studying Canada – as 
was not determined by the start of my regression, but rather chosen as a result of these 
analyses – one would be left with only 15 units after all variables are added. Instead, cross-
sectional time-series data generate 435 unites, allowing far more robust analyses. However, 
more importantly than securing a generous sample size, cross-sectional time-series is used in 
this dissertation for its unique ability to capture phenomena that might not be present in all 
states, at all times. This is particularly important with such a young research field that 
financialisation is. Though the temporal scope of financialisation has been somewhat 
established to be post-1970s, the spatial scope is still unclear. No existing findings allow us to 
conclude that “financialisation occurs independent of countries” or “financialisation does not 
at all occur in countries A and B”. The only temporal scope is that which is deduced here 
from the term “highly developed countries” which is taken to mean OECD-member states. 
The absence of such limitations prompts a cross-sectional time-series analysis. If one were to 
study causes of Shinto-based nationalism, for instance, the step from time-series data of Japan 
to cross-sectional time-series data of the world would not be particularly beneficial as it is a 





data on financialisation could show varying degree of presence across OECD-states. The 




4.3.1 Independent variables 
The included dimensions of financial deregulation are DIRECTEDCREDIT, 
CREDITCEILINGS, CREDITCONTROLS, INTRATECONTROLS, ENTRYBARRIERS, 
BANKINGSUPERV and SECURITYMARKETS. Capitalisation will be used henceforth to 
distinguish the digital variables from the broader concepts of the same name. All the 
independent variables capture the level of regulation in that dimension for each included year. 
By standardising values across countries, the authors facilitate cross-country comparisons that 
are essential to the type of analysis made in this thesis. The higher score any single unit 
receives, the less regulated it is country-year is. More than lack of variation, it is notable that 
there are extremely few instances where a country-year is found in the more regulated end of 
the spectrum (low score), regardless of which dimension one studies. Consequently, instances 
of little regulation of the financial sector (high score) are observed in the vast majority of 
country-years.  
 
DIRECTEDCREDIT captures the presence of publicly imposed demands on which sector 
credit should be directed at on an index from 1 to 3. CREDITCEILINGS is coded as a 
dummy, where 0 indicates the presence of a ceiling on bank credit expansion and 1 indicating 
absence. This variable has no variation – every single country-year scores 1, meaning no such 
ceilings are found in the sample. The same can practically be said about 
INTRATECONTROLS measuring government-controlled interest rates, in which a single 
country-year (Portugal 1991) scores 2 and all other units recording 3, meaning close to all 
country-years had a fully free interest rate. This, naturally, renders both of these variables 
unfit for regression. Yet, it is worth deliberating for a moment on this finding. The 
homogeneity of values has been pointed out multiple times, illustrating the all-covering 
ideological wave of financial liberalisation that has characterised the entire OECD. Though 





previous research, it does provide support for what by now is considered true – that 
financialisation is ongoing. The OECD financial sectors are increasingly left to conduct their 
business in peace, without government intervention. As seen in table 4.1, CREDITCEILINGS 
and INTRATECONTROLS are the only variables with zero or close to zero variation. Table 
4.1 is highlighted for its role in both visually explaining the width of financial deregulation 
and in highlighting the limited variation that is seen in all the variables. Quantitative analyses 
require variation to perform well. If all the observations of ENTRYBARRIERS = 1 are found 
in two countries and neither of those saw changes in WAGE_SHARE, there is no way we 
could use ENTRYBARRIERS to explain WAGE_SHARE.  This is clearly a shortcoming 
with this dataset, though this is still the dataset with the widest coverage and most nuanced 







 0 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 
DIRECTEDCREDIT  66  58  259 
CREDITCEILINGS  252     
CREDITCONTROLS  2 64 28 40 259 
INTRATECONTROLS    1  382 
ENTRYBARRIERS  9  26  348 
BANKINGSUPERV 11 55  138  179 
SECURITYMARKETS  5  22  356 
 
Table 4.1: Frequency of each unique value for all independent variables. 
 
Continuing the variable descriptions, ENTRYBARRRIERS records barriers for both foreign 
and domestic actors to establish new banks on a scale from 1 to 3. BANKINGSUPERV 
scores 0 to 3, based on the number of legislations passed to deregulate the supervisory 
agencies that year. The description of BANKINGSUPERV provided by the author includes 
an unfortunate typographical error that – due to the values set to this variable and how they 





describe the values on BANKINGSUPERV as higher equalling more regulation (contrary to 
all other variables), it is treated as if higher values equal less regulation – identical to the other 
variables, thus achieving uniformity and comparability across the dataset. Lastly, 
SECURITYMARKETS captures the presence of a market for securities, a financial product. 
This is coded on a scale of 1 to 3.  
 
4.3.2 Control variables 
Six control variables external to the Reform-dataset are added from a variety of sources to 
account for the effects of a few broadly reaching variables. This reduces the chances of 
experiencing omitted variable bias (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018). The value ranges can be 
seen in Table 4.2. These are INTERESTRATE, INFLATION, UNIONDENSITY, 
UNEMPPROTECTION, FEMLABOURFORCE and WARDUMMY. INTERESTRATE 
records the central bank interest rate and is assigned values equal to the actual interest rate it 
reflects. The values are in other words equal to some percentage level. Similarly, 
INFLATION records the real levels of inflation a country-year has experienced. 
UNIONDENSITY describes the percentage of the labour force that are members of a trade 
union. Percentages are also used in FEMLABOURFORCE, recording the percentage of the 
labour force that is female. Finally, WARDUMMY records 0 for years of peace and 1 for 
years of war. There are only 12 observations of war in this dataset, attributed to Australia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Turkey. Not surprisingly to those versed in global 
conflicts and geopolitics, the war observations in the anglophone countries are restricted to 
2001 and 2003. All the control variables are show in table 4.2 for assisting in interpreting the 
regression results. The effect size – or coefficient – of the regressions are not comparable 
unless they are standardised, which in turn comes with drawbacks. Knowledge of the 
underlying values does not allow comparison between variables, but does allow for better 






 Lowest Mean Median Highest 





INFLATION -1.13 5.72 2.43 105.22 
UNIONDENSITY 8.60 38.72 31.80 97.2 
UNEMPPROTECTION 0.09 2.15 2.32 4.83 
FEMLABOURFORCE 23.30 52.47 51.60 78.3 
WARDUMMY 0 0.03  1 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of the control variables included in the analysis. 
 
4.3.3 Dependent variables 
Lastly, the two dependent variables are selected on the basis that they best reflect the 
theoretical conceptualisation of financialisation. GDP_GROWTH captures the percentage at 
which GDP grows from the previous year, and WAGE_SHARE captures the percentage of 
GDP that is dedicated to labour compensation for employed persons – otherwise known as 
wages. Both dependent variables capture perfectly the concept they represent, as discussed in 
the conceptual chapter. Table 4.3 displays descriptive statistics of the dependent variables 
which assists in creating a picture of the cases at hand and assists in interpreting the 
regression results. The table creates an impression of the magnitude of difference within each 
variable. In order to secure the highest level of validity of the data, a range of tests and 






 Lowest Mean Median Highest 
GDP_GROWTH -6.29 3.11 3.10 10.90 
WAGE_SHARE 39.21 55.17 56.01 87.36 
 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables included in the analysis. 
 






Fixed effects are applied to my data to avoid certain key countries or years to 
disproportionally influence the analysis. Though fixed effects have nearly become the default 
approach for political scientists (Bell and Jones 2015, 133; K. A. Clarke 2005, 341), it is 
employed in a conscious choice for the value it brings to this thesis by potentially controlling 
for some undetected variables. For instance, if the calculated effect of interest rate controls is 
entirely carried by Lithuania, we can test if the effect stays when excluding Lithuania. This 
contributes to reducing omitted variable bias. The same goes for years: extreme outlying years 
can be controlled for, thus generating regression results that better reflect trends. By applying 
two-ways fixed effects, we can simultaneously account for all individual countries and years, 
returning results that more accurately depict the effect of financial deregulation across the 
included countries and the included period (Bollen and Brand 2010, 2; Schmidheiny 2012, 9). 
The immediate result of using fixed effects is that CREDITCEILINGS, 
INTRATECONTROLS and SECURITYMARKETS are automatically removed from the 
models as their variation can, in fact, be explained by a few countries or years. The two 
former are to be expected, as was touched upon earlier. SECURITYMARKETS does on the 
other hand have some variation, but its removal proves that it can be explained by a few 
countries and/or years. A glance at the data tells us that only five individual countries make 
up the values 1 and 2 for this variable, and Turkey can account for more than half of these 
observations. 
 
A key condition of an fixed effects regression is that the variables do not correlate with each 
other, otherwise known as multicollinearity (Donald and Glauber 1967, 92). Using the 
variance inflation factor-tests and basic correlation models, multicollinearity is discovered in 
the data (Craney and Surles 2002, 400). DIRECTEDCREDIT and CREDITCONTROLS 
score near perfect multicollinearity. DIRECTEDCREDIT is thus removed. Heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation are two other common issues in cross-sectional time-series or panel data 
that must be accounted for (Thomas, Vera E, and Philip 2005, 329). Heteroskedasticity is 
tested first using a Breusch-Pagan test and is found to be present (Breusch and Pagan 1979, 
1293). Autocorrelation is tested next using a Durbin-Watson test and is also detected (Durbin 
and Watson 1950, 409). The results of all tests conducted in this paragraph can be found in 
the appendix. Robust standard errors are then applied using the Arellano method to combat 





finally generated: lagged versions of the two dependent variables at one through three years of 
lag are added in addition to the default unlagged versions. The multiple levels of lag are 
chosen based on the absence of theoretical expectations for a specific number of years of lag. 
As there are no guidelines on which lag to expect, multiple variations are used in spirit of the 





The results are not overwhelmingly unidirectional, though some conclusions can be drawn 
without question. The most apparent effect is that of banking supervision on wage share 
which starts at a negative direction, but turns positive at the first lag and displays an 
increasingly strong coefficient. As if taken out of a textbook on lagged effects, there is no 
doubt that lag contributes to the effect of banking supervision, with longer lag giving the 
clearest effect. This relationship also shows the highest level of statistical significance, with 
significance at the 0.05 level for the first lag and the 0.01 level for the second and third lags. 
If financial deregulation has an effect, it should be found here. This is contrary to theoretical 
expectations which predicted a consistently negative relationship between banking 
supervision and wage share. The relationship between banking supervision and GDP is also 
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N 278 277 276 275 
ADJUSTED R2 -0.025 -0.085 -0.013 0.016 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.01  
Table 4.4: Regression table with all models on GDP_GROWTH. 
 
The effect on GDP_GROWTH as displayed in table 4.4 can best be observed from credit 
controls, where the coefficient direction is persistently negative and significant at 0.05 and 
0.10 levels. There does appear to be some real correlation there, though it is not as apparent as 
that of banking supervision. Barriers to the establishment of new banks show diverging effect 
directions with no statistical significance to support them. The results of the WAGE_SHARE 
models presented in table 4.5 show that BANKINGSUPERV has by far the most consistent 
statistical significance, at all three lagged models. While the effect direction changes from 
zero lag to the first lagged model, it is consistent throughout the lagged models. The change in 
direction can also be viewed as a consistent increase in the effect size from zero through three 
years of lag. The only other case of significance is seen in CREDITCONTROLS with one 
year lag. This variable shows no consistency in effect direction or size, making it challenging 





barriers and either economic growth or wage share in this sample. The goal for now is simply 
to present the findings, as they will be interpreted and analysed in a later chapter along with 
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N 278 277 276 275 





* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.01  
Table 4.5: Regression table with all models on WAGE_SHARE. 
 
The control variables show varying results, though INFLATION is consistently significant 
across all models, although at the 0.1 and 0.05 level for some models and with minor 
inconsistency in the effect direction in the GDP_GROWTH models. While these are 
interesting results that should be examined in more detail, they are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The main takeaway here is that financial deregulation likely does not explain all 
variance in economic growth and wage share. This is entirely as expected. The goal of this 
thesis is to see if financialisation can contribute to explaining economic growth and wage 
share, not if it is the single cause. Few concepts studied in the social sciences have a single 
explanation. 
 
The adjusted R2 score is found to be negative in all models but GDP_GROWTH t+3, 
WAGE_SHARE t+2 and WAGE_SHARE t+3. These scores do not tell us much on their 
own, they do tell us that the listed models have a somewhat better explanatory power than 
those with negative scores. The implication here is that the effect of financial deregulation 
likely is lagged. While it is tempting to conclude that the effect of deregulation can be 
anticipated at three and two years for the respective outcomes, such a conclusion would 
require far more rigorous theory development. Absence of a theoretical explanation or 
qualitative proof that the anticipated lag is three and two years renders such a task impossible 
with these findings alone. 
 
This data is used for two purposes. First, it sheds light on the correlation between various 
dimensions of financial deregulation and both GDP and wage share. However, the discussion 
and interpretation of these results against the presented theory is saved until chapter 5 in order 
to achieve a holistic analysis including both the regression and the process tracing. For now, 
the regression results are simply presented descriptively.  
 
The results differ according to which model and independent variable are scrutinised. They 
diverge in effect size, effect direction and significance. The conclusion to be drawn from this 





share. That is not to say that deregulation has no effect at all, but that nuance is required to 
discover what that effect is and how it works. One way to obtain such nuance is to create a 
larger dataset with far more dimensions of financial deregulation included. This would be 
extremely demanding. Even if one had the funding and skillset to start such a project, there 
would still be limited variation in observations. As the two intertwining concepts of 
financialisation and globalisation increasingly define national politics, financial deregulation 
will likely continue without reversal in many states. However, a highly complex dataset on 
financial deregulation with great coverage of both states and years would bring many 
opportunities to expand the financialisation theory with more nuanced, quantitative analyses. 
In the meantime, other methodological approaches must be employed. 
 
One approach to unpacking this black box that links financial deregulation to GDP and wage 
share is to do process tracing. The tools of process tracing have been developed precisely 
because of their utility for studying uncertain mechanisms. The need for a qualitative 
approach is particularly relevant when studying the financial sector as “cause and effect is 
nebulous in financial matters” (Cochrane 2014, 576). By diving deeper into a single case and 
observing real micro-events, one can attempt to conclude with more certainty the effects of 
financial deregulation while simultaneously gaining the ability to say how financial 
deregulation potentially causes economic growth and decreased wage share. Process tracing 
will be the focus of the next chapter. 
 
4.6 Case selection 
 
Beyond the ordinary correlational conclusions, the regression results are used in aiding the 
case selection process. The case selection process is present in steps A through E for 
maximum clarity. As financialisation is a rather new research field with limited empiricism, a 
most-likely on-the-line case is chosen. While results supporting the theory from a least-likely 
case would be highly valuable to financialisation theory, absence of such support would not 
be particularly meaningful as the scope and extent of this concept is still under exploration. 
On the contrary, failing a most-likely case would significantly weaken the theory, whereas 
most-likely case support contributes moderately to the theory’s validity (George and Andrew 





due to it being the single variable that has the clearest and most significant result. The 
direction or size of the coefficient is not regarded here. Clarity is valued to maximise the 
chance to discover meaningful results. While the effect direction of BANKINGSUPERV on 
both dependent variables is contrary to theoretical expectations, it is the consistency of that 
contradiction that is interesting. The effect of BANKINGSUPERV on WAGE_SHARE 
shows a negative and unsignificant effect the same year the deregulation has taken place, 
followed by three years of highly significant result and a consistently increasing coefficient. 
Time-series evolution of BANKINGSUPERV is visually examined next for all the individual 
states in figure 4.2. The goal here is to detect a sudden increase in the value of 
BANKINGSUPERV. This increases the chances that the effect of financial deregulation is 
isolated from exogenous effects, which in turns creates a better foundation for a qualitative 
analysis. 
 
(B) By eliminating states that have had a less shock-driven increase in the value of 
BANKSUPERV by three units in less than ten years, we are left with a handful of states: 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Poland. This limitation is arbitrary, 
naturally, yet serves the purpose of detecting shock-effects while simultaneously leaving 
multiple cases and thus allowing flexibility to check data availability before committing to a 
single case. The non-English speaking states are eliminated next for data availability. While 
this contributes to the ever persistent language-restricted research gap that likely exists in all 
research fields, there is simply no feasible solution to that gap with the limited scope of this 
thesis. (C) Finally, with Australia and Canada as the only candidates left, a probe-examination 
is conducted on the remaining cases to see if financial deregulation really did happen. (D) 
Canada stands out for having clear evidence of such deregulation and is thus selected as the 











Canada has over the past decades produced a range of regulatory documents regarding the 
financial sector. Examining every single one would transform this paper into a book – there 
are simply too many. (D) Instead, I focus on the 1990s as this is the period where financial 
deregulation in Canada spikes. According to the data in Figure 4.3, this is the period when 
Canada deregulated their financial sector the most and is thus the period where it would be 
most likely to discover significant cases to examine. This is in line with the literature on 
financial sector regulation in Canada which also points to the 1990s as an active period for 
deregulation (Daniel 2003). This period saw a handful of deregulations introduced, though 
their scope and mandate vary. The only significant changes were made in 1992 and 1999, 
where the former deregulated a wide range of minor financial activities and the latter allowed 
foreign bank branches to be established in Canada. (E) The deregulation of 1999 is selected 
due to limited data availability on former instances of deregulation. The primary data 
necessary to initiate a qualitative analysis is the legislative document that make up the bill. 
Fortunately, Bill C-67 is satisfactory distant in time to the changes in 1992 that one could 
reasonably attribute events and situations of the early 2000s to Bill C-67 – or at least isolate 
them from the 1992-legislation. Though the qualitative case of 1999 concerns foreign bank 
entry and ENTRYBARRIERS displayed no statistical significance, recall that it was 
BANKINGSUPERV that guided the selection of Canada. The discovery of a coding error – 
that there was in fact deregulation of bank entry despite this not being recorded in the dataset 










This chapter has provided a discussion of the multimethodological framework that guides the 
analyses of this thesis. A regression on various categories of financial deregulation. Shows 
that there is a particularly interesting correlation between deregulation of supervisory 
agencies and economic growth, as well as between the same deregulation and wage share. 
The results are employed in selecting Canada for the case study. Bill C-67 of 1999 is selected 






Chapter 5: Process tracing 
 
Before delving into the empiricism, a discussion of process tracing in methodological terms is 
due. Process tracing should not be seen as an alternative to regressions or other tools that 
predict covariance, but rather as an entirely independent approach to studying research 
questions. The question is no longer whether there is some connection between two 
theoretical concepts, as is the question attempted answered by most academic tools, but 
whether there really is a connection between two empirical situations and how that 
connection plays out (George and Bennett 2005, 206). As a part of a larger nested analysis, I 
unpack the assumed relationships identified in the previous chapter, that which is found 
between deregulation and GDP, and between deregulation and wage share. Regressions and 
other quantitative tools are unable to determine causal links, so a qualitative approach is 
necessary. While multiple qualitative tools are useful for discovering causal links, process 
tracing in particular excels at causal inference and uncovering how the causality between two 
variables works within an individual case (Beach and Pedersen 2011, 4; George and Bennett 
2005, 214). This approach allows me to showcase how exactly deregulation can cause an 
economic upturn as well as a decrease in the wage share of income. 
 
5.1 Mechanisms and steps 
 
Key to understanding process tracing and distinguishing it from other methods is its 
ontological foundations. Advocates of process tracing view causality in terms of mechanisms 
(Bennett 2010, 208; George and Bennett 2005, 231). Mechanisms are the processes through 
which one variable can affect another. They are not case specific in the sense that they 
describe an empirical chain of events, but they describe a context-specific arrow that links 
two concepts (Bennett and Checkel 2014b, 12). The social world is viewed as mechanistic by 
scholars of process tracing, meaning that there exists certain paths in a causal chain through 
which one concept influences another, though without the absolute certainty of a scientific 
law (Elster 1998, 45). In this way, process tracing is ontologically separate from quantitative 
as well as some qualitative research. Throughout this chapter, mechanisms will serve as the 





process tracing such as the one conducted here, mechanisms are not new discoveries, but are 
adopted from existing literature attempting to explain one or more of the same relationships 
studied here. The mechanisms employed here will be explicitly linked to the literature form 
which they are adopted. They are also explored in more detail in the theoretical chapter 
presented earlier. In the event that no theorised mechanism can logically connect the 
independent and dependent variables, one would have to propose new mechanisms or reject 
the possibility of a causal relationship. 
 
Mechanisms can be divided into steps that make up the smallest scale components of the 
entire causal chain. The relationship between variables, mechanisms and steps are illustrated 
in figure 5.1. These steps should be so fundamental that they in turn are considered laws or 
basic logic, such as the basic logic that most humans possess some perception of fairness 
(George and Bennett 2005, 227; Gerring 2007, 180). The reader should be able to instinctly 
agree that the microfoundational steps are real and sensible. It is not instinctly logical that a 
greater economy causes democratisation, but most would likely agree that a greater economy 
ceteris paribus probably means more funding available for education. This statement alone 
cannot explain the relationship between GDP and democratisation, but it can do so in 
conjunction with other microfoundations, such as the also sensible statement that education 
helps people make more informed decisions when they are voting. The entire relationship 
between GDP and democratisation requires many more steps to be convincing, but this 
paragraph illustrates why mechanisms can be convincing in explaining a relationship where 
correlations are less so. This way we can also infer causality between X and Y (Elster 1998, 







Figure 5.1: The components of a causal relationship. 
 
When identifying and measuring the abovementioned steps, researchers need to employ 
causal-process observations (CPO). These are the most fundamental type of data used in 
process tracing. Contrasted with the numerical data used in quantitative research, CPOs are 
data points of a qualitative nature with noncomparable format and scale (Brady, Collier, and 
Seawright 2010, 2; Gerring 2012, 328). There is no necessary objection to using numerical 
values as CPOs as it is the noncomparability that distinguishes them from data-set 
observations. This also means that CPOs cannot be plotted into a matrix for mathematical 
analysis, but must instead by assessed by the individual researcher’s analytical skills. 
Analysis utilising CPOs thus demand more scholarly discretion and correspondingly 
explicitness in how it is analysed. Though some fanatic quantitative scholars might view 
noncomparability as a weakness of CPOs, it can also be seen as a unique strength of this 
methodological approach. It is not uncommon for social scientists to study relationships, 
events or facts that would are highly demanding to gather a sufficient number of 
observations, if it is at all possible. Any single event – let us say the Napoleonic Wars – may 
potentially only contain a range of unique observations that each make up n = 1 in their 
respective categories, such as a single revolution and the single coup d’état that both 
contributed to the wars’ emergence. The coup and the revolution are not comparable, yet they 
together contribute to a narrative that can explain the Napoleonic Wars. The strength of CPOs 






Though process tracing is here worded as if it were a single method, it would be more 
accurate to distinguish multiple methods within the umbrella term that is process tracing. 
These more nuanced methods are theory-testing, theory-generating and explaining outcome 
(Beach and Pedersen 2011, 6). The overarching nature of this thesis can be described as semi-
explorative due to the use of nested analysis to better identify which variables are relevant for 
financial deregulation, but the isolated performance of process tracing is theory-testing. There 
is no particularly puzzling or unique outcome that needs to be explained, nor are entirely new 
mechanisms proposed. The goal here is to explore previously proposed mechanisms 
explaining the effects of deregulation and to see if they fit into the case at hand. 
 
5.2 Tools of process tracing 
 
The theoretical framework of process tracing typically presents four tests that can be applied 
to mechanisms and assists in building a plausible and convincing narrative of the process 
under study (Punton and Welle 2015, 3). These are straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun 
and doubly decisive. Straw-in-the-wind tests are weak indications of a connection between 
two items, though it does not confirm or exclude any explanation. Evidence of this type 
contributes to a narrative, but its absence does not create any implications. Similar to a tree in 
a forest: it is a part of the forest and its presence contributes to the forest, but its absence does 
not mean that no forest can exist. Hoop tests are tests that should be passed if one is to 
believe the explanation, though without the ability to confirm that explanation. A forest 
cannot grow on bare rock so there must be nutritious soil on the ground for a forest to exist. 
The absence of nutritious soil means we can immediately rule out the possibility of a forest. 
However, nutritious soil could be found elsewhere and thus does not confirm the existence of 
a forest. The difficulty of the criteria of a hoop test and the certainty of the evidence 
presented against it decides what conclusions we may draw. An easy test with certain 







Smoking guns are evidence that explicitly confirm the connection, but which’s absence does 
not disprove anything. If you can see hundreds of trees in front of you, you should reliably be 
able to say that you are in a forest. Should you however not see hundreds of trees because 
you are staring into a boulder, will you not be able to reject the possibility that you are 
standing in a forest. Doubly decisive tests are those that can confirm one explanation while 
simultaneously rejecting others. If you hike an hour into the wilderness and discover 
hundreds of trees that you can observe from multiple angles, as well as touch and smell, you 
can reliably say that you have indeed found a forest and also say that you are not in an art 
installation of fake trees inside a shopping mall.    
 
Though finding doubly decisive evidence would make quick work of any theory, they are 
highly unusual to be found in the social sciences. Instead, this thesis relies almost exclusively 
on hoop test, as can be expected in much social science (Beach and Pedersen 2018, 123–24). 
Logical conditions tying together the steps of a theoretical mechanism can be constructed and 
tested far more easily than smoking gun tests or doubly decisive tests. Straws-in-the-wind 
hold such minimal value that they are not sought out. With the methodological background 
and implications of process tracing assessed, the next step in the quest for causal inference is 
to trace the process from financial deregulation to increased GDP and decreased wage share.  
 
5.3 Structure of the analysis 
 
With the above outlined methodological foundation and guidelines in mind, this chapter 
examines deregulation of the financial sector of Canada in 1999 and the few years after in 
which its effects are observed. In June of 1999, bill C-67 with the full name “An Act to 
amend the Bank Act, the Winding-up and Restructuring Act and other Acts relating to 
financial institutions and to make consequential amendments to other acts” was passed in the 
house of commons (Daniel 2003, 6). This bill encompassed a multitude of minor changes, 
with the central change being the opening up for foreign banks to establish full-service 
branches in Canada. Prior to the bill, foreign banks could only open subsidiaries. This 
specific bill will serve as the starting point for the process examined here. Utilising primarily 





in the sense of Elster’s analysis of causal mechanisms (2015, 3). As in a court case, the 
evidence will at first simply be presented and interpreted in a temporally linear manner, but 
not yet analysed. Causal inferences will not be made until the next chapter. 
 
This chapter will present and interpret causal-process observations, using tools and guidelines 
from the methodological literature on process tracing. The analysis of these observations 
against my theory is saved for the next chapter. The remainder of this chapter is structured 
into three sections that each correspond to key elements of the research question. These are: 
(5.4) change in behaviour, (5.5) increased GDP and (5.6) decreased wage share. These 
correspond to the independent variable, the first dependent variable and the second dependent 
variable, respectively. Section 5.4 aims only to determine whether the independent variable 
took place and to determine how it manifested into real events. Section 5.5 regards the 
relationship between deregulation and GDP, whereas section 5.6 regards the relationship 
between deregulation and wage share. Temporal and logical linearity are absolute 
requirements in process tracing (Punton and Welle 2015, 2), so section 5.4 needs to be tested 
prior to section 5.5 and 5.4 needs to also occur prior to 5.6. Recall that economic growth and 
wage share are two different results from deregulation. The existing literature indicates that 
the economy grows prior to decrease in wage share, but these are not intervening variables. 
As such, the order in which section 5.5 increased GDP and 5.6 decreased wage share are 
presented here does not reflect a continuous path from deregulation, through GDP and to 
wage share. This chapter should instead be understood as a path from deregulation to GDP 
and then a path from deregulation to wage share. 
 
After establishing that the independent variable took place, the two following sections will 
each have three theoretically grounded mechanisms. These are organised as subsections. 
Minimum requirements for these mechanisms are presented in line with best practices to 
illustrate what level of detail and type of evidence is satisfactory to accept that the theorised 
mechanism took place (Bennett and Checkel 2014a, 261). I want to emphasise that these 
criteria were established prior to data collection and analysis, and are thus not adapted to the 
findings. Finally, the mechanisms are tested in individual steps, all of which are backed by 
causal-process observations (CPO1 – CPOn) that are presented and analysed, allowing us to 





effect of deregulation on GDP and wage share of total income. It is these CPOs that serve as 
the empirical data. As a tool for keeping track of the analyses, each mechanism will be 
concluded with a figure displaying the relevant steps and whether or not they were found to 
be present. In summary, each section of the research question will be presented in the 
remainder of this chapter along with their respective mechanisms, their fulfilment-criteria and 
subsections to fulfil those criteria. I find support for the change in behaviour following 
deregulation, the mechanism of foreign direct investment on economic growth, the 
mechanism of credit-led growth and the mechanism of finance-led growth. 
 
5.4 Change in behaviour 
 
In order for deregulation to have an effect on GDP and wage share, one must first establish 
how the deregulation manifested. In this case, deregulation regarded foreign bank branches, 
and so we should observe such foreign bank branches before any other step of the causal 
chains. In more general terms, we are studying the immediate and direct effect of the 
independent variable. The evidence found here are necessary for the two larger causal chains 
and it contributes to the narrative presented in those chains, but the conclusions drawn here 
are only conclusions for this section. In other words, a confirmation of the expected change in 
behaviour is a useful confirmation that contributes to the larger causal chains, but does not 
confirm the relationship between deregulation and GDP or between deregulation and wage 
share. 
 
Identifying the theorised effects of deregulation first requires an assessment of whether it had 
any effect at all. In this case that means seeing if Bill C-67 of 1999 caused the change in the 
Canadian financial environment it intended. Given that it allowed the establishment of 
foreign bank branches, one should expect to see such branches established in the period after 
1999. The appearance of such branches is the only criterion in this section. This did occur. 
Limited data availability sabotages the possibility of composing a full list of foreign bank 
branches established in this period. Yet, there is evidence of some foreign bank branches 
being either introduced from scratch or being converted from pre-existing subsidiaries of 





opened branches in Canada in 2000. The following year saw Deutsche Bank AG joining the 
Canadian banking market with its local branch, while First Commercial Bank opened its 
branch in 2002 and United Overseas Bank converted their subsidiary to a full service branch 
the same year.  
 
The latter bank specifically state on their website that the 2002 conversion was due to the 
deregulation that took place in 1999 (“United Overseas Bank (UOB) Sets Up New Branch in 
Canada” 2002). Sure enough, the conversion would be entirely impossible without that 
deregulation. However, this explicit statement indicate that the United Overseas Bank and 
potentially other banks too might have been sitting on the fence prior to the deregulation, 
waiting for Canada to liberalise. This should be distinguished from China Construction Bank 
that opened their Canadian branch in 2016, which is less clearly a direct response to the 
deregulation. As of 2014, Canada had 27 banks in the “Schedule III” (the regulatory term that 
is used for foreign bank branches by public entities, where Schedule I and II cover domestic 
banks and foreign subsidiaries, respectively) category (“Who We Regulate” 2014). While 
these branches have emerged over a period of about two decades, it is clear that at least some 
foreign bank branches were a direct response to the deregulation. They did not simply expand 
for the sake of expanding, but they were triggered by the deregulation to act. This explicit 
statement should be considered as a smoking gun. Due to the rare and convincing nature of 
smoking gun type evidence, Bill C-67 should be seen as a direct cause for the establishment 
of foreign bank branches in Canada after 1999. Keep in mind, though, that this smoking gun 
only confirms precisely the above – the establishment of foreign bank branches as a response 
to Bill C-67. It cannot on its own confirm the larger causal chain between deregulation and 
any of the dependent variables. Yet, it is useful evidence in supporting the larger causal 
chains and will play a valuable role when considering the questions of causality.  
 
A final CPO to be considered for this section is asset value. Data on foreign bank (both 
subsidiary and branch) assets in Canada indicate an approximately doubled combined value 
of these banks over the course of 1999 to 2001, strengthening the view that foreign bank 
branches appeared shortly after the bill was introduced (Hinchley 2006, 7). Though it might 
be possible for the foreign banks asset value to increase due to other circumstances – such as 





timing relative to Bill C-67. Similarly, though foreign bank branches might be established 
without a significant increase in foreign bank asset value, this too seems unlikely. The 
significant increase observed here should perhaps not be treated as a hoop test – a necessary 
condition – but should be seen as strong straw-in-the-wind type evidence. 
 
The establishment of foreign bank branches fits the archetype of a hoop-test, where its 
presence alone fail to prove that the mechanism took place, but its absence would be 
detrimental to the theory. In other words, it would be impossible for deregulation to cause 
increased GDP and decreased wage share if the newly deregulated activity – foreign bank 
branches – was non-existent. The combination of foreign bank value, the actual establishment 
of foreign banks branches and the smoking gun from United Overseas Bank leaves a picture 
that is highly convincing that Bill C-67 achieved its desired effect of bringing foreign bank 
branches into the Canadian financial market. This mechanism is illustrated in figure 5.2 The 
next question then becomes whether these branches had any effect on economic growth. This 
effect is proposed by the existing literature to occur through multiple mechanisms, which will 
be presented below.  
 
Figure 5.2: The immediate effect of the independent variable, from deregulation to foreign 
banks. Green/solid border = proven, red/half solid border = disproven, grey/dotted border = 
not examined. 
 






With the knowledge that foreign bank branches were indeed present after 1999, we may start 
to examine the dependent variables. First of these is GDP. This section applies tools of 
process tracing to the alternative mechanisms that seek to explain increased GDP as a result 
of deregulation.  
 
5.5.1 GDP Mechanism 1: Support apparatus 
Recall from the theoretical chapter that Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Min’s proposal that 
foreign banks bring with them a greater support apparatus (1998, 9). Support apparatus refers 
to the various organisations external to the foreign bank branches that are needed for the 
branches to conduct their business. For instance, they require credit rating agencies to 
evaluate the branch’s assets. In addition to general expanding due to a larger customer base, 
auditing firms and supervisory agencies now not only need to employ individuals competent 
on domestic banking law in Canada, but they also have to employ individuals competent on 
the newly assented Bill C-67. Rating agencies – one of the services required by foreign bank 
branches – work under the legal title of Designated Rating Organizations (DROs) in Canada, 
of which there are only four today (“Credit Rating Agency” 2021). All these were established 
businesses in Canada prior to 1999, with the only exception being DBRS Limited which was 
established in 1976, but only was approved as a DRO in 2012. These dates indicate that the 
DROs’ existence has not been a response to increased demand by new foreign bank 
branches4, and accordingly could not have been results of the 1999 deregulation. Demirgüç-
Kunt, Levine and Min also point to other support services required by foreign banks, such as 
accounting firms and auditing firms. Unfortunately, data on accounting and auditing firms is 
not available. Based on DROs, however, there is no indication that this mechanism took place 
and thus cannot have contributed to GDP. The entire mechanism along with information on 




4 A critique might be that one should look at employment numbers or budgets of these DROs. Such data is 





Figure 5.3: The mechanism of support apparatus. Green/solid border = proven, red/half 
solid border = disproven, grey/dotted border = not examined. 
 
5.5.2 GDP Mechanism 2: Employment in finance 
A second proposed mechanism linking deregulation to increased GDP is that of employment 
in the financial sector (Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, and Min 1998, 9). Foreign banks, like any 
organisation or business, require personnel to administer them and to service customers. 
Establishing a Canadian branch by any foreign bank thus requires employing a reasonably 
high number of individuals, which in turn contributes to GDP as these individuals spend their 
income on consumption. Looking at employment numbers by sectors, there is a clear growth 
in the number of people employed in finance and insurance (“Labour Force Characteristics 
by Industry, Annual (x 1,000)” 2021). Comparing the numbers prior to and after 1999, 
employment in finance and insurance grew by 7% from 1989 to 1999 and then by 22% from 
1999 to 2009. The year of deregulation marks a clear junction. However, accounting for 
population growth and general employment levels by looking at share of all employed 
persons, it is less clear (figure 5.4). After dropping in 2000, the employment share increases 
again in 2001 and 2002. One could possibly make the argument that this fluctuation shows 
the effect of deregulation to be lagged by a single year, followed by two years of positive 





longitude of that lag in the literature. As long as the lag is uncertain and the effect is unclear, 
one cannot make certain claims about the effect of foreign bank entry on GDP through 
employment levels in the financial sector. As is illustrated in figure 5.5, the analysis of this 
mechanism ends as soon as the causal chain between the steps is broken. There is no value to 
researching all the steps if a necessary preceding step is not found to occur. 
 








Figure 5.5: The mechanism of employment in the financial sector. Green/solid border = 
proven, red/half solid border = disproven, grey/dotted border = not examined. 
 
5.5.3 GDP Mechanism 3: Foreign direct investment 
Another way to view the same general effect is by looking at foreign direct investment (FDI) 
(Levine 1996, 237). As foreign banks enter the Canadian banking market, large investments 
are required to construct offices and employ staff. Furthermore, the banks require large 
volumes of capital to conduct their business, which includes issuing loans to consumers and 
businesses or trading in bonds. It is reasonable to assume that foreign bank branches are 
components of very large banks in terms of value, as smaller banks would limit their 
operations to their immediate market. One should thus expect the opening up to foreign banks 
to generate FDI, followed by an increase in GDP growth (1996, 238). Data on FDI inflow in 
Canada shows a very distinct peak in 2000, precisely after the deregulation (figure 5.6). 
There is little doubt that something caused this dramatic increase. Given the fact that foreign 
bank assets doubled in this exact same period, it would not be unreasonable to assume that 





Figure 5.6: Foreign direct investment inflow as share of gross domestic product in Canada. 
 
As the FDI peak occurred in 2000, we should find economic growth from 2000. Though there 
is a large drop in 2001, 2000 saw very high levels of growth in relative terms (figure 5.7). 
With only crude, yearly data available, it is difficult to tell which came first of GDP or FDI. 
Near perfect overlap of the FDI peak and the GDP peak, in addition to strong fit to the 
theoretical mechanism is sufficiently convincing to conclude that GDP grew as the next step 
of the mechanism. In other words, this is an indication that deregulation contributed to 
economic growth through the mechanism that is foreign bank branches’ need for FDI inflow. 





Figure 5.7: Gross domestic product growth in Canada. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: The mechanism of foreign direct investment inflow. Green/solid border = proven, 






In summary, clear support can only be found for the mechanism linking deregulation to 
increased GDP through inflow of foreign direct investment. The observations from 
Designated Rating Organisations show no support. Employment data is indicative at best, but 
is realistically inconclusive. 
  
5.6 Decreased wage share  
 
This section regards the relationship between deregulation and wage share. Three 
mechanisms originally presented in the theoretical chapter are briefly re-stated and then 
tested. These mechanisms are credit-led growth, investment shift and finance-led growth. 
 
5.6.1 Wage share mechanism 1: Credit-led growth 
For this next subsection, the analysis will utilise the theoretical framework of a finance-led 
growth model. The key distinction between credit-led growth and wage-led growth is that the 
former uses credit to substitute wages where they are insufficient to sustain consumption 
(Baccaro and Pontusson 2016, 186). Growth is in such cases still fuelled by consumption, but 
workers must rely upon credit in order to keep or increase their attained lifestyles. The causes 
for stagnant wages are numerous, including weakened unions and the natural development of 
capitalism through long term capital accumulation, as was discussed in detail earlier (Bresser-
Pereira 2010, 511; Foster and McChesney 2012, 39). One cause may be that credit-based 
consumption disguises the stagnation of wages, as consumption is sustained and the built-up 
debt is temporarily kept at a distance. 
 
The conditions required to make a causal claim about the effect of deregulation on decreased 
wage share are the following. First, the deregulation must have the ability to increase credit-
led consumption. This means that the newly established foreign bank branches must be 
allowed to issue loans. Second, these banks must have capital available to fund the loans. 
Consequently, we must be able to show that foreign bank branches did in fact issue loans. 





indeed was credit-led. Finally, there should evidence of a higher GDP growth than growth of 
real wages. 
 
The first criterion can easily be tested by examining the text of Bill C-67. §538 states that 
authorised foreign banks may engage in activities generally to be considered as bank 
activities, and explicitly includes “any financial service” as well as “issuing payment, credit 
or charge cards” (Martin 1999, para. 538). In other words, the foreign bank branches were 
given the authority to issue credit – a necessary condition for the causal chain to continue 
uninterrupted. Next, they would have to have capital available, either in the form of direct 
ownership or as credit to another bank. Capital availability is neatly confirmed as it is a 
written requirements in order for new banks to be approved, with a requirement of 
10.000.000 CAD (1999, para. 534). This is in addition to more general requirements of 
financial soundness and the ability to function in and contribute to the Canadian financial 
system (1999, para. 526). Actual levels of foreign bank brand and subsidiary assets show an 
approximate doubling in the period 1998-2001 (Hinchley 2006, 7). The legal requirements 
and the asset data paint a clear picture and so it should be safe to conclude that any approved 
foreign bank branch has capital available to issue credit.  
 
With the judicial and financial powers to serve as creditors out of the way we still have not 
confirmed whether foreign bank branches actually did contribute to a credit-led growth by 
issuing loans. By looking at financial data for foreign banks from the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions we can see that the total sum of loans as sources of 
income for foreign banks fluctuates with approximately 10 billion CAD around a gravity 
point of 50 billion (“Financial Data for Foreign Bank Branches” 2020). This gives a 
somewhat ambivalent picture of lending by foreign banks. As data are available from 1996 – 
three years prior to Bill C-67 of 1999 – they must include foreign bank subsidiaries, which 
were legal in Canada earlier than foreign bank branches. Although there is a spike in loan 
income in 2000 from 1999, such spikes occur on multiple occasions, along with equally 
strong drops. Yet, the fact that we cannot see an unambiguous increase in loan income after 
the deregulation is not necessarily contesting the presence of a causal chain. What matters for 
this particular criterion is that lending happened, which it did, and in rather high sums at that. 






Given that foreign bank branches issue loans, one would expect to see this reflected in the 
debt levels of the general population. The receivers of credit are not specified in the above 
data, so it is not entirely clear from that alone whether credit is given to businesses, 
individuals or even public entities. The theoretical foundation here rests on the assumption 
that credit is given to individuals who then consume on a personal level, as opposed to 
businesses which consume on an industrial level. We can then expect to see household debt 
rise as a response to the entry of foreign bank branches. The data tells that household debt 
grew fluctuating – but always positive – before the deregulation, experienced a short dip at 
negative growth in 2000, followed by what can only be termed an explosion of household 
debt from 2001 onward (figure 5.9) (“Household Sector Credit Market Summary Table, 
Seasonally Adjusted Estimates” 2021). While some lag is to be expected from all policy 
changes, it is often uncertain how much lag to expect. That uncertainty of lag-length is also 
present in financialisation theory. Considering that there is no clear guidelines on how long 
after the deregulation of the financial sector one can expect to see changes, there is no 
theoretical contradiction between the dip of 2000 and the expected growth in household debt. 
The unidirectional and exponential growth from 2001 onward is so strong that it eliminates 
the uncertainty surrounding lag. If anything, these results indicate that the lag indeed is two 
years. Rigorous testing of two years lag on deregulation is far beyond the scope of this thesis, 






Figure 5.9: Household debt growth in Canada. 
 
Finally, if GDP is led by some other factor than wage-based consumption, we should see a 
higher level of growth of GDP than growth of wages. While it would be intuitive to continue 
using the wage share variable central to the entire thesis, this cannot in fact capture the binary 
question of whether or not GDP is wage-led. Wage share of total income can only capture 
changes in this relative level. As long as data for the non-wage share of income is not 
available, it is impossible to tell which source is dominant. If, however, we study GDP versus 
real wages, we can at least tell whether wages could be the dominant source. Or to put it in 
reverse, if GDP grows more than wages, there is no way wages can be the main contributor to 
GDP. Looking at both average real wage growth (figure 5.10) and median real wage growth 
(figure 5.11), this is the case for every year in the relevant period and almost every year for 
which data is available. The only exceptions in the wider period are 2008-2009 when GDP 
drastically decreases – which are exactly as expected, given that these were the prime years 
of the Great Recession in which financial products plummeted in value – and 2015. There is 
also an exception in 2013 on the median wage model. However, these longer trends only 





of course the ones before and after 1999, and they all indicate that there could be some other 
leading factor than wages. The conlcusion is that credit-led growth did contribute to 
decreased wage share (figure 5.12). 
 
 
















Figure 5.12: The mechanism of credit-led growth. Green/solid border = proven, red/half 
solid border = disproven, grey/dotted border = not examined. 
 
5.6.2 Wage share mechanism 2: Productive firms shift investment 
Another proposed mechanism to explain the effect of deregulation on wage share is 
introduced by Stockhammer, where deregulation facilitates a larger financial market which in 
turn draws investments from the real economy, making businesses less dependent on workers 
and consequently reducing or stagnating their wages (2017, 10). First, we should observe that 
the financial market grew in size. Second, we should observe that non-financial businesses 
shift their investments from the real economy to the more profitable financial sector. Third, 
the investments in finance should make up a larger portion of their revenue. Fourth, this 
should make them less dependent on their workers. Lastly, we should be able to observe that 






The most effective way to measure the size of the Canadian financial market in line with the 
theory would be to look at the value of the financial in relative as well as fixed terms. Judging 
from figures 5.13 and 5.14, there has been a significant growth in the Canadian financial 
market, both as a share of GDP and at basic prices. “Finance as share of GDP” best controls 
for inflation and other macroeconomic trends, while simultaneously risking that the displayed 
growth is merely a result of changes to other components of GDP, such as a hypothetical 
collapse of a certain sector. To capture an imagine reflecting the real events, both 
measurements are included. The effect is highly similar in both, though with sharper 
fluctuations in the “share of GDP” data. Keep in mind the uncertainty surrounding lag. As 
long as its extent is unknown, one could argue that the change in finance as share of GDP is 
inconsistent. However, the consistent and unidirectional development of finance at basic 
prices is far more convincing. A critique of this conclusion would be that the discovered trend 
started prior to Bill C-67 and continued long after, except for a halt around 2007. It is then 
vital to remember the goal of finding a hoop here, not a smoking gun or doubly decisive. 
These data do not prove causality between steps two and three, or three and four, but they 
allow for the causal chain to proceed. This hoop test is thus passed. The Canadian financial 






Figure 5.13: The financial sector as share of gross domestic product in Canada. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: The financial sector value in Canada adjusted for inflation and set to 2012 






Next, we should be able to observe a shift in investment by non-financial firms from 
productive assets to financial assets. For the sake of commensurability, this is operationalised 
in line with existing literature as a change in the sources of income for non-financial firms 
(Stockhammer 2004, 729). An OECD report points to as a particularly prominent case of that 
shift, as non-financial firms started seeing better investment opportunities in financial 
products since 2000 (Tebrake and O’Hagan 2017, 181). The temporal positioning of this shift 
is, of course, perfectly situated relative to Bill C-67. Placing this CPO in the four tests 
outlined earlier is challenging. While it certainly can be considered a hoop test in that it must 
necessarily be found for the causal chain to continue uninterrupted, there is also some explicit 
dimension to the fact that previous research claims a causal link between the financial 
market’s profitability and the shift in investment. Regardless, it is convincing evidence that 
this shift could have been a result of deregulation.  
 
Step five in this mechanism is the decreased dependency of corporations on their employees. 
This can be tested by examining the number of wage settlement agreements that were made 
in the relevant period. As seen in figure 5.15, these data are inconclusive (“Collective 
Bargaining Trends in Canada, 1984-2014” 2017). While there is no doubt about a long-term 
downward trend – indicating decreased bargaining power for workers – one cannot make 
convincing conclusions based on this. If we consider the years 2000 – 2004 as step four 
(investment shift) is seen to start in 2000, one can certainly claim that corporations became 
less dependent on their workers as fewer settlements were made. However, the years 2005 – 
2006 saw an increase of settlements. This V-turn development, combined with the long-term 
downward effect cannot distinguish the mechanistic effect under examination here. As such, 






Figure 5.15: Number of wage settlement agreements in Canada. 
 
Figure 5.16: The mechanism of shift in investment. Green/solid border = proven, red/half 






5.6.3 Wage share mechanism 3: Finance-led growth 
A final mechanism is constructed by combining the two wage share-mechanisms, where a 
finance-led growth occurs as a result of crowded out productive investments and that growth 
becomes entirely limited to the financial sector. First, financial markets should grow in size 
as a result foreign bank entry. Second, we should see that the productive sector investment 
shifts towards the financial sector. Third, we should see stagnant wages. Lastly, there should 
be economic growth. Economic growth should occur simultaneously to the stagnation of 
wages, as it is the combined effect of these that constitute the mechanism.  
 
A larger financial market has already been determined to have occurred above in 5.6.2. Shift 
in investment from the productive sector to the financial sector was also found to occurred. 
The shift was found to be starting in 2000 and the stagnation of wages must be sequentially 
after the investment shift, so wage stagnation must occur immediately after 2000. Looking at 
figure 5.10, the wage growth does appear somewhat stagnant. With the exception of a small 
increase in 2003 followed by an equal decrease, real hourly average wages in Canada 
remained stable from 2000 until 2003. If we look at real hourly median wages in figure 5.11, 
we get a similar picture, although with a far clearer downward trend. This proves without 
doubt that wages stagnated. In addition to the more convincing trend in the latter, median 
wages also likely better capture the phenomenon under examination. The theoretical 
mechanism presented earlier in this thesis specifies that economic growth continues without 
benefiting workers. If this is true, there is a possibility that only the wealthiest receive wage 
increases. That could explain the difference in average and median wages, and finds support 
for the mechanism. This is sufficient evidence to support the hoop test that wages stagnated 
following the investment shift.  
 
 
The final criterion is whether there was economic growth at the same time as wage 
stagnation. Wages stagnated in 2000 – 2003, so this is the period under we should observe 
economic growth. Referring back to figure 5.7 that was presented earlier, we can see that 
GDP growth was fluctuating in this period with an overall reduction in growth levels from 
2000 until 2003, but still always remaining at positive values. In other words, the hoop test is 





means that every criterion of the mechanism of financial-led growth is fulfilled, as can be 
seen in figure 517. It is plausible that this mechanism contributes to explaining the effect of 
financial deregulation on wage share. 
 
 
Figure 5.17: Path-dependent mechanism of finance-led growth. Green/solid border = 




We are then left with a picture that looks as follows: Section 5.4 Foreign bank entry shows 
that foreign bank branches were established in Canada, including at least one bank that 
explicitly attested this to Bill C-67, and a general growth in foreign bank value. Section 5.5 
Economic growth has proven that there was no visible increase in financial support 
institutions after Bill C-67, there was no unambiguous increase in employment in the 
financial sector, though there was a significant increase in inward foreign direct investment. 
Section 5.6 Wage share illustrates that foreign bank branches are allowed to issue credit, 
they have the capital to do so, they receive a substantial amount of their income from credit 
rents, the credit levels of households explode upwards, and GDP is not led by wages. 
Additionally, I have shown a continued path from a growing financial market, through a shift 





wage stagnation and economic growth. After now having presented the causal-process 






Chapter 6: Interpretive analysis 
 
This chapter ties together the theoretical expectations, the proposed hypotheses, the 
quantitative findings and the qualitative findings. The two have unique ontological 
foundations so the findings should also be seen as independent of each other. The use of 
multiple methods allows me to comment on the cross-case effect of financial deregulation 
and the within-case effect of foreign bank entry in Canada. 
 
6.1 Quantitative findings 
 
Based on the conceptualisation of financialisation and on the financialisation literature, I 
expect a dual effect of financial deregulation. The first effect is that one will experience 
economic growth, the other is that one will experience a decreased wage share. The first 
takeaway from the regression results is that measuring the effect of financial deregulation is 
challenging due to extreme homogeneity of values across the sample. The level of 
homogeneity causes four out of seven total dimensions of financial deregulation to be 
excluded as soon as fixed effects are applied. While coding decisions influence the nuance of 
variation one can capture, it is also an inherent challenge of studying financialisation that all 
researchers of the field must face. This limits the possibility of interpreting the regression 
results as “financial deregulation”. The results should be interpreted as follows: out of 
deregulation of credit controls, barriers to bank entry and supervisory agencies, credit 
controls is seen to have the most consistent effect on economic growth, whereas banking 
supervision displays the clearest effect on wage share. Both of these bivariate relationships 
show overall statistical significance with near complete consistency in effect direction. The 
only potential caveat to complete consistency is the negative effect of banking supervision in 
the model without lag and positive effect on all the lagged models. This can, however, be 
interpreted as a continuous scale, starting negative and increasing positively with each lag. 
 
The above are the most interesting individual findings. If we instead look at each outcome 
holistically, we can see that the majority of the coefficients on economic growth are negative. 





are negatively associated with economic growth, which is in contrast to expectations. The 
expectations outlined in the theoretical framework indicate that financialisation causes 
economic growth. The findings here are an indication that this might not be the case. While 
the variable coverage is too narrow to make claims about all financial deregulation – and 
even less so to make claims about financialisation in general – they can tell us that 
deregulating credit controls and banking supervisory agencies are probably not an efficient 
route to take if one wishes to achieve economic growth, which is a common political goal. 
Deregulating the entry barriers for new banks may be more bountiful in the long run, as it is 
positively associated with economic growth after two and three years, though this too is 
overshadowed by inconsistency and statistical insignificance.  
 
If we look at the effects on wage share, we can see a similar contradiction to the expectations. 
The majority of the variables and models are positively associated with wage share. This 
means that deregulating bank entry barriers or banking supervisory agencies will, after a first 
year of negative effects, likely increase the wage share of the economy. The results of credit 
control deregulations are too inconsistent to regard.  
 
What do these results tell us about the world and about the theory on which the expectations 
were generated? While complete theory-building is beyond the boundaries of this thesis, one 
can imagine that the financial deregulation contributes to instability of the financial sector 
and corresponding decrease in the value of financial assets. If that instability and value drop 
is isolated to the financial sector, then it would decrease economic growth without affecting 
workers’ wages. As long as the economy decreases more than wages, the latter will 
necessarily constitute a larger portion of the former. However, this hypothesised scenario 
would not make sense if the claim that the financial sector is increasingly entrenched in the 
real economy were true. It could be the case that financial sector penetration of the real 
economy is limited to a few cases, such as perhaps the United States which has received 
much scholarly attention. A comparative study of the effects of financial deregulation in two 
cases where one has experienced financial sector entrenchment in the real economy and the 






6.2 Qualitative findings 
 
While the regression results are valuable, they were only half the reason for conducting a 
regression analysis. The other half was case selection for the purpose of process tracing. The 
majority of the contributions of this thesis come from the process tracing. 
 
The initial finding from studying deregulation of foreign bank entry in the form of Bill C-67 
in Canada is that the bill achieved its intended goal of inviting foreign banks to establish local 
branches. This finding is a crucial hoop test, as its failing would immediately interrupt the 
causal chain. As foreign banks did establish themselves in Canada as a result of deregulation, 
five mechanisms adopted from existing literature and one mechanism constructed by myself 
from existing ones are tested. Starting with the mechanisms that related the introduction of 
foreign banks to economic growth, there is found no support for a growing support apparatus 
or employment in finance as bringers of wealth. I do, however, find support for the 
mechanism that sees foreign direct investment inflow as a pathway to economic growth. 
Though there could of course be other pathways that are not theorised yet, and though there 
are other pathways in the existing literature, I have included the ones that are compatible with 
the theory and case at hand.  
 
Deregulating foreign bank entry barriers did contribute to economic growth in Canada as the 
multitude of international banks that established offices there brought much capital with 
them. The temporal proximity of these events ties the Bill C-67 to the establishment of 
foreign bank branches, foreign direct investment inflow and economic growth. The nature of 
foreign bank regulation makes it difficult to employ these findings in future policy 
recommendations. Canada has already allowed foreign banks to establish local branches and 
cannot repeat that deregulation since it now already is allowed. However, as long as they 
continue to allow so, more banks will likely be established and contribute to economic 
growth. Although the internal validity is the strongest selling point for process tracing 
analysis, that does not mean that a similar effect like the one seen after deregulating foreign 
bank entry cannot be found elsewhere. There is nothing in the findings that indicate this 





ENTRYBARRIERS and the presence of a negative effect direction does not render this the 
most likely effect to be found outside Canada. 
 
Moving on to the effect of foreign bank entry on wage share, three other mechanisms are 
examined. No support is found for the mechanism of investment shift. While such an 
investment shift did occur, it did not reduce the businesses dependency on workers and 
correspondingly the workers’ bargaining power. Support is, however, found for the credit-led 
growth mechanism. A chain of steps links the foreign bank branches to an increased use of 
credit which, through increased consumption, contributes to GDP without benefiting workers 
and their wages. While deregulating foreign bank entry can only be done once to the (full) 
extent that Canada did in 1999, this does indicate that other institutions that may contribute to 
increases lending may have a similar effect as foreign banks did. That discover highlights the 
value of unpacking the mechanisms. What may otherwise just have been a claim that foreign 
bank entry caused decreased wage share is now more nuanced and reflective of real events. 
Individuals concerned about decreasing the wage share should not only be wary of foreign 
bank deregulations, but of deregulating any institution or activity that may contribute to 
credit-led growth. 
 
Lastly, I also find that finance-led growth contributed to a decreased wage share. The 
profitability of the financial sector in the aftermath of Bill C-67 caused productive businesses 
to invest in the financial sector rather than in expanding their productive services, which 
contributed to economic growth without contributing to workers’ wages, resulting in a 
decreased wage share in Canada. The issue of using economic growth and GDP as a metric 
for desired economic trends, which is a recurring theme of this thesis, is seen here. The 
dominance of economic growth as a metric risks completely overshadowing other metrics 
that affect more induvial lives, causing countries and voters to support policies that do not 
benefit workers. Canada and other countries should be transparent about the anticipated 
effects of various policy choices, and the background for those choices. Other financial 
deregulations or other policies entirely that contribute to the profitability of the financial 







Yet, although I allude to externalising the qualitative findings, these are merely open 
questions of whether the same causal mechanisms could exist elsewhere. In my analysis I 
found no CPOs that indicated the causality to be case-specific. That does not imply that the 
findings are generalisable, but it does not imply that they necessarily cannot be found 
elsewhere either. External validity is still a key drawback from using any kind of within-case 
analysis, including process tracing (Schimmelfennig 2014, 104). That means that the results 
found here should not be expected to be applicable to other cases than Canada. That is not an 
issue as long as we are transparent about what claims we can make. The objective of 
conducting process tracing was to make causal inferences within the case, not beyond it. That 
objective has been accomplished. However, the extent to which this limitation to external 
validity is true is dependent on the nature of the causal process observations.  
 
Finally, the contradictory results of finding foreign bank entry barrier deregulation in Canada 
and the regression displaying no significant effect of bank entry barriers is worth noting. The 
most likely explanation to this is that the effect of the other countries in the regression are 
contradictory to Canada and thus negated the effect of Canada. The qualitative findings are 
seen as more reliable here than the regression findings due to the prowess of process tracing 







Chapter 7: Summary 
 
This thesis has examined whether there exists a dual effect of increased economic growth 
alongside a decreased share of total income appropriated by labour. Such an effect is found to 
be present in Canada after deregulating foreign bank entry barriers with Bill C-67 in 1999. 
After assessing potential causal mechanisms adopted and constructed from theoretical 
literature, multiple paths are found to link the independent and dependent variables. Lessons 
from Canada tell us that foreign bank entry may accompany foreign direct investment and 
consequent economic growth, but may also bring with them decreased wage share through 
both credit-led growth and finance-led growth. 
 
The results from the regression analysis on OECD-member states do, however, not support 
the research question. While a dual effect is found from credit controls on economic growth 
and from banking supervisory agency deregulation on wage share, both of these effects are in 
the opposite direction than what was expected from the research question. This does not 
render the findings any less valuable, though. To confirm these relationships, future research 
should conduct hypothesis testing, focusing only on cases where credit control deregulation 
and banking supervisory agency deregulation are present. Neither of these deregulations were 
found to be present in Canada and cannot as such be confirmed or rejected. Still, the findings 
in Canada does moderately weaken our confidence in these two deregulations. 
 
The methodological approach employed in this thesis make important contributions to the 
literature. Some aspects of financial deregulation are shown to be more impacting than 
others, while some mechanisms of foreign bank entry are proven to have causal effects. In 
addition to the abovementioned hypothesis testing, some still unanswered questions for future 
researchers to examine are the role of lagged effects on financialisation and the effects of 
excluded categories of financial deregulation. Furthermore, future research may utilise the 
findings presented here to continue Lieberman’s nested process by adjusting theoretical 
expectations and testing again on another case. For now, we know that financial deregulation 
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Appendix A: Quantitative data tests 
 
Multicollinearity 
Variance Inflation Factor test for multicollinearity could not be conducted due to the presence 
of aliases in the models. This in itself is a result indicating multicollinearity. A correlation 
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WARDUMMY -0.04897514 -0.06636904 0.02012210 1 
 
Heteroskedasticity 
The Breusch-Pagan test produces the following result. 
BP = 2.6582, df = 9, p-value = 0.001639 
Autocorrelation 
The Durbin-Watson test produce the following result. 
DW = 0.45389, p-value < 2.2e-16 
